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Prologue
On April 12, 1995, the Connecticut Superior Court issued its
long-awaited decision in Sheff v. O'Neill,' the landmark school deseg-
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tireless efforts contributed so much to its publication.
1. No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1148, at *1 (Apr. 12, 1995).
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regation case. Sheff was the first case since the mid-seventies to chal-
lenge the doctrine and rationale of federal school desegregation cases
on the basis of state constitutional provisions alone.2 Specifically, the
Sheff plaintiffs argued that a metropolitan-wide remedy should be im-
posed to cure metropolitan-wide school segregation, whether or not
state action infused with discriminatory intent caused the segregative
conditions. 3
The Sheff case was brought by seventeen African-American, His-
panic, and White children attending schools in Hartford, Connecticut
and one of its contiguous suburbs.4 As is the case in many metropoli-
tan areas throughout the United States, over 90% of the children at-
tending the inner city's schools of Hartford are members of minority
groups,5 and virtually 100% of the children attending the suburban
schools are White. The plaintiffs asked the court for a judgment de-
claring that "separate educational facilities for minority and non-mi-
nority students are inherently unequal."' 6 They argued that by
knowingly maintaining public school districts segregated by race and
ethnicity, the state violated each student's fundamental right to an
equal educational opportunity,7 a right clearly established under the
Education8 and Equal Protection9 Clauses of the Connecticut Consti-
tution. Plaintiffs asked the court to order the State to require Hart-
ford and its suburban districts to jointly develop a plan addressing
these segregative conditions and to reconfigure school district bound-
aries or take other steps necessary to eliminate educational inequi-
ties,'" a remedy not available under federal law."
Not surprisingly, the State of Connecticut has based the crux of
its defense on federal equal protection standards.'2 It has claimed as a
threshold matter that unless the plaintiffs prove that state action
caused the segregative conditions, the state cannot be held responsible
for correcting those conditions. 3
2. Id at *3-*4.
3. Id. at *23.
4. Id at *1.
5. Id at *40.
6. Id at *3.
7. Id at *3-*4, *27.
8. CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. See infra note 65 for the text of this provision.
9. CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 1 and 20. See infra note 66 for the text of these provisions.
10. Sheff v. O'Neill, No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS, at *3 (Apr. 12,
1995).
11. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
12. Sheff, No. CV89-0360977S, slip op. at *73-*89.
13. Id. at *5, *27-*28.
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
Sheff was filed on April 28, 1989.14 On April 12, 1995, the supe-
rior court held in favor of the State of Connecticut entirely on the
basis of federal precedents and the federal state action/discriminatory
intent/causation standard,'15 without any attempt to construe the Con-
necticut constitutional provisions under which the case had been
brought.
On April 27, 1995, the Connecticut Supreme Court accepted the
Sheff case on direct appeal. This led some observers to hope for an
ultimate decision more in keeping with the Connecticut judiciary's re-
cent history as one of the leaders in the state constitutional law move-
ment. On numerous occasions, the Connecticut Supreme Court has
demonstrated a willingness to provide greater protection for individ-
ual rights-beyond that provided under the Federal Constitution-by
giving independent meaning to the state constitutional provisions. 6
This Article reflects on the anomaly of the superior court's deci-
sion in Sheff in light of this recent history and recommends that the
Connecticut Supreme Court use an alternative, analytical framework
based on the Connecticut Constitution to decide the Sheff appeal.
This independent approach is equally available to all state courts seek-
ing to resolve fundamental issues under their own constitutions. Only
by speaking in a clear, state voice can state courts balance the consti-
tutional vision of the federal courts and fulfill the promise of the state
constitutional law movement.
I. Introduction
The newly rediscovered vigor and promise of state constitutional
law has dominated legal discourse since 1977 when Justice Brennan
issued the following call to arms in his seminal article:
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens
the full protections of the [F]ederal Constitution. State constitu-
tions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections
often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has
brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit
the independent protective force of state law-for without it,
the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.'7
14. Id. at *1.
15. Id. at *86-*87.
16. See infra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
17. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977).
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Justice Brennan's call for a rebirth of state constitutionalism could be
construed as merely recommending a return to the original federalist
principles, which recognize that allocating the powers of government
among federal and state entities would protect the interests of citizens
more effectively than concentrating power within one governmental
entity alone.18
However, some scholars argue that Justice Brennan was not ad-
vocating a restrictive view of state constitutionalism in which each
state turns inward to create an independent constitutional vision
based on unique state sources and local circumstances. Rather, these
commentators argue that Justice Brennan was urging state courts to
rejoin the common enterprise of defining the meaning and the param-
eters of American constitutional values. Professor Paul Kahn, for ex-
ample, takes this view of Brennan's intentions and agrees that what is
needed is not a return to the old federalism but rather an expanded
American constitutional dialogue in which state courts play a key role:
"When there is only a single view of the possibilities of law, the mean-
ing of the constitutional order is impoverished. A democracy that
does not debate the legal boundaries of its own political choices is
already failing the constitutional project."' 9 Professor Kahn urges
state courts to enter freely into an expanded constitutional dialogue
on the meaning of American citizenship 20 in order to serve as a "pow-
erful counterforce" 2'1 to the federal courts.
Since 1977, commentators22 and state courts23 have answered Jus-
tice Brennan's call for an expanded constitutional dialogue and have
looked to state constitutional provisions to provide protection for the
18. Yvonne Kauger, Reflections on Federalism: Protections Afforded by State Constitu-
tions, 27 GONz. L. REv. 1, 1 n.1 (1991-92). Kauger quotes from THE FEDERALIST to make
her point: "'In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each sub-
divided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time
that each will be controlled by itself."' Id. at 1 n.1 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
353, 356 (A. Hamilton, J. Madison, and J. Jay), reprinted in THE CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
Co. (1916)).
19. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV.
L. R.Ev. 1147, 1155 (1993). Kahn quotes from a portion of Brennan's article which sup-
ports the view that Brennan saw an activist role for state courts in the national debate:
"'[S]tate courts [should] thrust themselves into a position of prominence in the struggle to
protect the people of our nation from government intrusions on their freedoms."' Id. at
1151 (quoting Brennan, supra note 17, at 503) (emphasis added).
20. Kahn, supra note 19, at 1168.
21. Id. at 1166.
22. The volume of scholarship in this area has been documented by other scholars, and
therefore a lengthy citation will not be given here. Many of the most influential writings
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
rights and liberties of state citizens beyond the minimum of federal
protections. Today, no commentator and certainly no judge, either
state or federal, would deny that state courts have the power, and in-
deed the duty, to independently interpret their own constitutions.24
Nor has this power been newly-created out of the crucible of late
twentieth century constitutional theory. From the colonial period un-
til the federal domination of the rights dialogue began during the War-
ren Court era, state courts routinely exercised full judicial review25
and acted to protect the rights and liberties of citizens under their own
constitutions, many of which predated their federal counterpart.26
Connecticut's own constitutional history is exemplary in this re-
gard. Chief Justice Peters has noted that Connecticut is not merely
called the "Constitution State" because of its role in the creation of
the Federal Constitution, but rather because by 1638 the Colony had
promulgated the Fundamental Orders,27 a set of principles referred to
by many scholars as the world's first written constitution.' These Or-
ders established a democratic form of government and granted signifi-
cant rights to citizens against the incursions of government.29
The rights of Connecticut citizens were further expanded by the
enactment in 1650 of a statutory declaration of rights."0 This declara-
tion of rights became a body of fundamental law which safeguarded
on the topic have been cited separately throughout the body of this work. See, e.g., Kahn,
supra note 19; Kauger, supra note 18.
23. Recent estimates indicate that in over 450 cases prior to 1992, state courts inter-
preted state constitutional guarantees as going beyond federal constitutional minimums.
Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court and Democratic
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 19, 27 (1989). See
also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and The States: The Revival of State Consti-
tutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 548 (1986).
24. For a full discussion of the basis of state court authority in this regard, see infra
notes 224-228 and accompanying text.
25. Unlike the Federal Constitution, state constitutions often expressly provide for the
exercise of judicial review by state courts. See infra notes 236-240 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
27, Ellen A. Peters, Common Law Antecedents of Constitutional Law in Connecticut,
53 ALB. L. REv. 259, 259-60 (1989) (citing Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1638), re-
printed in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 249-52 (B. Poore ed., 1878) [hereinafter
ORGANIC LAws]).
28. Robert I. Berdon, The Connecticut Constitution: An Analytical Framework for
Raising State Constitutional Claims in Connecticut, 14 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 191, 192 (1994).
29. The Fundamental Orders were later incorporated into and supplemented by the
charter granted to the colony in 1662 by Charles II. This charter extended "all the 'liber-
ties and immunities' of the realm of England" to Connecticut citizens. Henry S. Cohn,
Connecticut Constitutional History-1636-1776, 64 CONN. B.J. 330, 335 (1990).
30. Berdon, supra note 28, at 192.
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individual rights and liberties by granting equal protection and provid-
ing for due process and the protection of reputation.3' Other rights
now termed "constitutional"-such as freedom of religion, the right to
legal counsel, protection against double jeopardy and defamation,
rules against censorship and unreasonable searches and seizures-
were also protected by the Connecticut courts under a variety of com-
mon law antecedents.32
Therefore, long before the Federal Constitution was drafted and
even prior to the enactment of Connecticut's first formal constitution
in 1818,3 1 Connecticut courts freely invoked a rich body of state law to
protect individual rights.34 Except for the period during which the
vast expansion of constitutional protections by the federal courts
seemed to cast doubt on the continuing need for an independent state
constitutional jurisprudence, Connecticut state courts have continu-
ously exercised their authority to resolve controversy and safeguard
the liberties of citizens under the fundamental laws of their state.
In Connecticut, as in other states, however, the effort of the state
judiciary to emerge from the torpor caused by federal domination was
hampered by a series of state constitutional cases which declared that
state provisions were to be interpreted as having "like meaning and
similar limitations" to their federal counterparts.35 After a somewhat
31. Id at 194. From the date of enactment, these statutory rights were occasionally
amended to provide additional rights, but never to curtail previously existing rights. ld. at
192.
32. Peters, supra note 27, at 261. That Connecticut citizens possessed a wide body of
human rights safeguarded by the civil government was well understood in the eighteenth
century. Legal commentators of the time, such as Judge Jesse Root, charged the state with
the responsibility of ensuring "the advancement of order, peace and happiness in society,
by protecting its members in the quiet enjoyment of their natural, civil, and religious rights
and liberties." RooTs REPORTS xvi (1789-1793), quoted in Ellen A. Peters, State Supreme
Courts in our Evolving Federal System, 17 Intergovernmental Persps. 21, 21 (1991) [herein-
after Peters, Evolving Federal System].
33. CONN. CONST. of 1818, reprinted in 1 ORGANIC LAws, supra note 27, at 258-66.
34. Chief Justice Peters has suggested that Connecticut constitutional law, statutory
law, and natural and common law principles were all endowed with what would today be
called a "constitutional penumbra." Peters, Evolving Federal System, supra note 32, at 21.
Peters has also observed that it is this multifaceted nature of Connecticut constitutional
history that
provides our state constitutional law with a starting point that is different from
federal constitutional law. A constitutional tradition that does not draw hard
lines of separation between constitutional, statutory, and common law precepts
emphasizes that ... a state court must cast a wide net in searching for guidance to
resolve invariably troublesome constitutional controversies.
Id. at 22.
35. Virtually all states have had such "like meaning" cases to contend with. See, for
example, Cyphers v. Allyn, 118 A.2d 318, 321 (Conn. 1955), but other examples abound.
slow and inconsistent start, Connecticut courts have acted to repudi-
ate these precedents. Two cases in particular, Fasulo v. Arafeh36 and
Horton v. Meskill,37 recognized the "primary independent vitality of
the provisions of our own constitution, '38 and indicated that state and
federal provisions do not have to be read with like meaning and simi-
lar limitations. Although federal case law may be considered by state
courts in adjudicating state constitutional issues,39 this consideration
"in no way compromises [the state courts'] obligation independently
to construe the provisions of our state constitution."4
In line with this obligation, Connecticut courts have responded to
Justice Brennan's call to rejoin the constitutional discourse. As the
United States Supreme Court has moved inexorably to subordinate
individual rights to private and governmental interests in the areas of
equal protection,4' criminal procedure,42 privacy, 43 free exercise,44
procedural due process 45 and others, the Connecticut judiciary has ex-
36. 378 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1977).
37. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
38. Id at 371. Although the old "like meaning" language occasionally finds its way
into current cases, the term now appears to stand for the proposition that the Connecticut
Constitution "shares but is not limited by the content of its federal counterpart." Fasulo,
378 A.2d at 554.
39. State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232 (Conn. 1992), sets forth an analytical frame-
work for state constitutional claims. The tools of analysis to be considered are: first, the
text of the state constitutional provision in question; then, the holdings and dicta of the
supreme and appellate courts of the state; federal precedents; sister state decisions; history;
and economic and sociological considerations.
40. State v. Lamme, 579 A.2d 484, 490 (Conn. 1990).
41. See, for example, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), all of which imposed a discriminatory intent standard for
federal equal protection cases. See also City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (invalidating minority set aside plan); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding no fundamental right to education under the Federal
Constitution).
42. See, eg., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (finding no constitutional basis
for keeping victim impact evidence from the jury in capital cases).
43. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (state statute criminalizing ho-
mosexual sodomy upheld). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980), and other recent abortion cases which, while confirming a woman's continuing right
to an abortion under Roe v. Wade, 400 U.S. 113 (1973), nonetheless sanction state laws
placing limits on that right or placing restrictions on those women who can exercise it.
44. See, e.g., Employment Div., Ore. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (state may deny unemployment benefits to those who engage in the use of drugs in
religious ceremonies).
45. See e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (no right to
counsel in parental status termination proceedings).
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panded the rights of citizens under state constitutional provisions in
several key areas. In Doe v. Maher,4 6 for example, the court rejected
the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v.
McRae4 7 and struck down, under the state Due Process Clause, a Con-
necticut regulation restricting the right to medicaid payment for abor-
tions.48 In State v. Davis,49 the court created a rule different from the
federal courts on the ultimate right to call a witness under Article I,
Section 8 of the state constitution. Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State5 ° ex-
panded state protection of religious freedoms beyond the federal
model. An expansion of rights has also occurred in several other key
areas, including search and seizure,"1 substantive due process,52 and
freedom of expression. 3
By the time State v. Dukes54 was decided in 1988, the Connecticut
Supreme Court could firmly state that, although Connecticut courts
are free to follow the lead of the federal courts at their discretion,
"this court has never considered itself bound to adopt the federal in-
terpretation in interpreting the Connecticut [C]onstitution.... Thus,
in a proper case 'the law of the land' may not, in [the] state constitu-
tional context, also be 'the law of the [S]tate of Connecticut.' '55
46. 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
47. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
48. 515 A.2d at 450.
49. 506 A.2d 86 (Conn. 1986).
50. 441 A.2d 16 (Conn. 1981).
51. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315 (Conn. 1993) (invalidating as a matter of
state constitutional law, warrantless automobile search conducted while automobile is im-
pounded at police station); State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225 (Conn. 1992) (rejecting claim
that emergency situation existed to support police officer's warrantless entry into hit and
run driver's house in order to arrest him); State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300 (Conn. 1992)
(rejecting claim that police officer had reasonable basis for suspicion to seize defendant).
52. See, e.g., Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu Partnership v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101
(Conn. 1994) (holding that statute prohibiting party engaged in business of selling motor
vehicles from selling them on Sunday violates substantive due process under Connecticut
Constitution).
53. See, e.g., Dow v. New Haven Indep., Inc., 549 A.2d 683 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1987)
(holding that statements in editorials, clearly labeled as such, about public officials con-
cerning matters of public concern, are entitled to an absolute, unconditional privilege).
54. 547 A.2d 10 (Conn. 1988).
55. Id. at 18-19. See also id. at 17 (citing State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446 (Conn. 1988);
State v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1245 (Conn. 1987); State v. Scully, 490 A.2d 984 (Conn. 1985);
State v. Couture, 482 A.2d 300 (Conn. 1984) and others, including Horton v. Meskill, 376
A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977), and Fasulo v. Arafeh, 378 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1977)). Connecticut's
independence in constitutional adjudication is but a part of the nationwide trend. Many
other state supreme courts have been developing a different constitutional vision than that
which is developing under federal law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470
N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984); Durant v. State Bd. of Educ., 381 N.W.2d 662 (Mich. 1985); Wein
v. State, 347 N.E.2d 586 (N.Y. 1976) and Wein v. Carey, 362 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1977).
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
One of the most important examples of the state judiciary's will-
ingness to forge an alternative constitutional vision for Connecticut
came in Horton v. Meskill,56 a 1977 case in which plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of Connecticut's school financing scheme. Just
four years earlier, the United States Supreme Court had faced an al-
most identical challenge in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.5 7
The Court decided Rodriguez during a period of intense debate
over whether the right to equal access to education should be added
to the expanding list of fundamental rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brown v. Board of Education58 had suggested as much
almost twenty years earlier.59 In Rodriguez the Court, which techni-
cally had been asked to determine whether the school finance laws of
Texas violated the United States Constitution, was in fact being asked
to reflect on much more: the role of education in a democracy. In a
five-to-four decision, the Rodriguez Court upheld the Texas financing
laws despite the substantial disparities in funding between districts
with predominantly poor, nonwhite students and districts which had
predominantly affluent, White students.60 The Court also found that
education was not a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 6' and that the poor were not a suspect class for federal equal
protection purposes.62 Rodriguez was one of the first federal educa-
tion cases to place educational policymaking back into state hands. In
particular, the job of determining the meaning of "an equal educa-
tional opportunity" was effectively returned to the states. As some
commentators suggested, in some ways this was a welcome return to
normalcy.63
Four years later, when Horton' challenged the Connecticut
school financing scheme, it seemed that the task had passed back into
56. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
57. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments .... It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities
.... It is the very foundation of good citizenship.... In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education." ktL at 493 (emphasis added).
60. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN
IN AMERICA'S ScHooLs 214 (1991).
61. 411 U.S. at 33.
62. Id at 36-37.
63. Bernard James & Julie M. Hoffman, Brown in State Hands: State Policymaking and
Educational Equality After Freeman v. Pitts, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 521, 525 (1993).
64. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
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safe hands. Acting decisively to reject the approach taken by the
United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez, the Connecticut Supreme
Court interpreted the Education 65 and Equal Protection66 Clauses of
the Connecticut Constitution as together creating a fundamental right
to an equal educational opportunity.67 Finding that wide disparities in
funding between rich and poor school districts were violative of this
fundamental equality right, the court in Horton struck down the
state's school finance scheme.68
65. CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("There shall always be free public elementary and
secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by
appropriate legislation.").
66. CONN. CoNs-r. art. I, § 1 ("All men when they form a social compact, are equal in
rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges
from the community.") and § 20 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his
civil or political right because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.").
67. Horton, 376 A.2d at 369-70.
68. Id. Many other states have taken part in this important educational equality de-
bate since Rodriguez. By 1993, courts in thirty-three states had decided challenges to the
constitutionality of school finance schemes. Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and
Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive
Government, 24 Rutgers L.J. 1057, 1079 n.112 (1993). In fifteen states, the financing sys-
tems were held to be unconstitutional. Id. In many of these cases, education was also
found to be a fundamental right under state constitutional law, as was the case in Connecti-
cut. See, e.g., Shostall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 v.
Dupree, No. 77-406 (Ch. Ct., Pulaski City, Ark. Oct. 26, 1981); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano
II) 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Rose v. Council
for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Somerset County Bd. of Educ. v.
Hornbeck, No. A-58438 (Cir. Ct., Baltimore, Md., May 19, 1981): Helena Elem. Sch. Dist.
v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684 (1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973); Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en bane); Kukor v. Grover, 436
N.W.2d 568 (Wisc. 1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979); Washakie County
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
In eighteen of the thirty-three states, the challenged state finance scheme was upheld.
Feldman, supra, at 1079 n.112. In several of these cases, courts appeared to rely on the
separation of powers doctrine, fearing that to direct the state legislature to alter its school
funding policies would place the court in the position of a superlegislature. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Engel King, 537 P.2d 635, 640 (Idaho 1975). Some scholars argue, however,
that reliance on this doctrine is but one more device employed by state courts to avoid
their responsibility to flesh out the meaning of equality in an educational setting. Feldman,
for example,. suggests that although a state legislature may be empowered by the state
constitution to develop policy and allocate funds for public education, only the state judici-
ary can decide the content of positive state constitutional guarantees, such as the right to a
free and public education. Feldman, supra, at 1087.
Other scholars have suggested that the idea that a state legislature acting alone can
decide the constitutional parameters of an equal educational opportunity may have re-
sulted from a "fundamentally flawed view of the concept of judicial review." James &
Hoffman, supra note 63, at 555 (quoting Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Polit-
ical Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031, 1031 (1985)). See also Peter J. Galie, The Other
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
Interpreting the Connecticut Equal Protection Clauses in Horton,
the state supreme court opted to retain the "tiers of scrutiny" ap-
proach of the federal courts, but declined to import the federal state
action/discriminatory intent/causation threshold test for finding gov-
emnment responsibility.69 At most, the court applied an "effects" test
that requires a showing that a specific condition, such as an inequity in
school financing, "resulted" from delegating legislation. Once shown,
the court could conclude that such a result constitutes a violation of
both the Equal Protection Clauses of the Connecticut Constitution
and the duty to provide for equal educational opportunity by taking
"appropriate legislative action."7 Unencumbered by the separation
of powers doctrine which burdened other states in making this deci-
sion, the Connecticut Supreme Court instructed the state legislature
to develop appropriate legislation that would minimize the funding
disparities between school districts in keeping with the fundamental
right to a substantially equal educational opportunity.71
The Horton case, and many of the Connecticut constitutional
cases discussed above which followed during the next decade, rein-
forced the impression that the Connecticut judiciary was determined
to exercise its independence from federal court domination and to
summon the "strength and the will to undertake the painstaking task
of assigning independent meaning to independent state constitu-
tions. ' 72 In fact, until the Connecticut Superior Court decision in
Sheff v. O'Neill was announced in April 1995,'7 it appeared that Con-
necticut courts had entered the expanded constitutional dialogue with
vigor and become exemplars of the kind of new state constitutional-
ism lauded by Professors Bernard James and Julie Hoffman in their
recent work on the topic:
Whatever one may think of the phenomenon of modem state
constitutional law in the abstract, it is now clear beyond quibble
that these documents have become the cloth out of which mod-
Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 731
(1982) and Joshua S. Lichtenstein, Note, Abbott v. Burke: Reaffirming New Jersey's Consti-
tutional Commitment to Equal Educational Opportunity, 20 HoFsTRA L. REV. 429 (1991).
Interestingly, four of the states which upheld their state finance systems, Arizona,
Maryland, West Virginia and Wisconsin, nevertheless found a fundamental right to educa-
tion under their state constitutions. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 548 n.128.
69. 376 A.2d at 369.
70. IL at 376.
71. Id.
72. Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradi-
tion, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 583, 593 (1986) (book review of DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985)) [hereinafter State Constitutional Law].
73. No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1148, at *1 (Apr. 12, 1995).
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ern social compacts are woven. . . . [S]tate constitutions are
being used to provide a forum for both discussion and resolution
of the major issues of the day.74
In light of this recent history, it would seem that the Connecticut
Supreme Court's decision in Horton would have impelled the lower
court to take the next logical step in Sheff. Recall that in Horton, the
court found that the specific condition of inequity in school financing
resulted from delegating legislation and constituted a violation by the
State of both the Equal Protection Clauses of the Connecticut Consti-
tution and the duty to provide for equal educational opportunity by
appropriate legislation.7 5 The Sheff plaintiffs argued that Sheff is a
"perfect analog" to Horton.76 Indeed, it seems a very short step to
find in Sheff that another specific condition-the racial and ethnic seg-
regation of the schools in Hartford and its suburbs-also resulted
from delegating legislation by the state. This legislation created local
school districts and attendance zones which have made racially bal-
anced schools, also required under Connecticut law, impossible to
achieve in metropolitan areas throughout Connecticut. This statutory
scheme may, therefore, also constitute a violation of both the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Connecticut Constitution and the duty to
provide for equal educational opportunity by appropriate legislation.
Missing the analogy completely, the lower court in Sheff failed to
take the next step. Distinguishing Horton on dubious grounds, the
court stated that the Horton plaintiffs were attacking only the specific
statute which created the school finance system, whereas the Sheff
plaintiffs were challenging the present condition of racial segregation
in the Hartford schools.77 Yet, how is it possible that a landmark case
brought solely under state constitutional provisions could prompt a
lower court decision utterly devoid of any analysis of those state pro-
visions? How is it possible that after six years of adjudication, the
court could decide this case based entirely upon federal standards and
cases? The Sheff court found that "the plaintiffs have failed to prove
that 'state action is a direct and sufficient cause of the conditions'
which are the subject matter of the plaintiffs' complaint.., and that
accordingly the constitutional claims asserted by the plaintiffs need
not be addressed. 78
74. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 526.
75. 376 A.2d 359, 376 (Conn. 1977).
76. Sheff, No. CV89-0360977S, slip op. at *66.
77. Id. at *67-*68.
78. Id. at *89.
There are no easy answers to these questions. Perhaps it was sim-
ply a case too hot to handle, or a failure of judicial nerve when con-
fronted with an issue pregnant with enormous societal and political
implications. Certainly, in retrospect, the Rodriguez case passed some
relatively easy educational issues back into state hands. Unlike the
Federal Constitution, virtually every state constitution has an educa-
tion clause which mandates, or at least permits, the state legislature to
provide for a free and public state educational system.79 Only a short
step was required for some state courts to declare that this positive
right guaranteed to all citizens was also fundamental under their
state's constitutional scheme. The issue of equalizing state funding for
education so as to minimize the disparities in the educational opportu-
nities offered to rich and poor children, though somewhat more con-
troversial, has nonetheless been tackled by the majority of states
following Rodriguez, albeit with differing outcomes.8 0
Prior to the Sheff case, however, no state had been forced to face
the monumental and politically charged equality issue left over from
the United States Supreme Court's school desegregation decisions in
Keyes v. School District No. 1,81 Milliken v. Bradley,' and their prog-
eny: Is a student's right to an equal educational opportunity violated
when a state's system of school districting and attendance zones re-
sults in that student attending a segregated school?
Surely this is one of the most troubling issues of our time, espe-
cially in the North where in scores of metropolitan areas similar in
character to Hartford and its surrounding suburbs, children attend
schools every day in segregative conditions that seem impossible to
imagine forty years after Brown. Virtually every federal school deseg-
regation decision since Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed-
ucation8 3 has narrowed the Brown mandate and handed the states
79. David Dormont, Separate and Unequal- School District Financing, 11 LAW AND
INEQUALITY 261, 276 (1992).
80. See supra note 68 for discussion of the outcomes of challenges to school finance
schemes in thirty-three states.
81. 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (holding desegregation remedies for southern schools ap-
proved in earlier cases are equally applicable to northern school districts never segregated
by law, but only where local officials had pursued deliberately segregative policies).
82. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (rejecting a metropolitan-wide remedy for Detroit and holding
that it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of state or local school districts, or of
a single school district, have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation).
83. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For cases after Swann which have consistently pulled back from
ordering all-out desegregation remedies, see Keyes, 413 U.S. 189 (1979), and Milliken, 418
U.S. 717 (1974). See also Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). In
that case, the City had met its goals in the areas of pupil assignment and the hiring and
promoting of teachers and administrators for one year, but not thereafter. Id. at 431. The
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convenient doctrines which they might employ effectively should they
wish to avoid facing the issue altogether. The de jure/de facto distinc-
tion, the discriminatory intent/causation standard, the local control of
schools imperative, the separation of powers doctrine, and the state
action requirement used so effectively by Judge Hammer in Sheff,
have all served to insulate states from the moral imperative of Brown
and often enabled state courts to turn a deaf ear to the inequality
claims of school-aged plaintiffs.84
What might help account for the anomaly of a state declaring ed-
ucation to be a fundamental right, but then treating educational equal-
ity as merely an option, is a philosophy which values liberty over
equality and extols the virtues of local control and the private "free"
choices of individuals to move to suburbs with the guarantee of all-
white schools. Professors James and Hoffman have described "a curi-
ous pattern of resistance among states to a notion of 'equality of edu-
cational opportunity' if it truly means 'equality of opportunity through
education' and an equal chance to succeed.18 5 It would seem that this
resistance becomes especially pronounced if it is suggested that a child
only has a chance to succeed in the majority culture if she is allowed
to attend schools alongside members of that culture.
Court held that one year of compliance justified removing the issue of pupil assignment
from the remedial authority of the courts, thereby assuring resegregation. Id. at 434-45.
See James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 533. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992), in which the Court, faced with racially identifiable schools in DeKalb County,
Georgia, reasoned that these segregative conditions were caused by free demographic
choices. Id- at 494. Judges thereafter had the discretion to measure incremental progress
toward unitariness and relinquish jurisdiction over those areas free of the vestiges of offi-
cial race-based policymaking. The most recent of these cases, Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.
Ct. 2038 (1995), held that the State of Missouri could stop supporting the Kansas City
schools (where $1.5 billion has been spent to date to build the nation's finest educational
facilities without producing any measurable improvement in student achievement), even
though no improvement in test scores has yet been produced. ld. at 2055-56. Apparently,
the improvement in educational outcomes will no longer be the test for relinquishing fed-
eral court jurisdiction over a district's desegregation plan, even if that improvement has
been established as one of the major objectives of the plan. As a further slap to the district
court in the case, the Supreme Court also disapproved Kansas City's goal of building mag-
net schools to attract White students back from the suburbs, as an impermissible way to
achieve an interdistrict remedy where no discriminatory intent had been proven. Id. at
2051.
84. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 526.
85. Id. at 572. Jonathan Kozol has reflected on the underlying cause of this resistance:
"This, then, is the dread that seems to lie beneath the fear of equalizing. Equity is seen as
dispossession. Local autonomy is seen as liberty .... Again there is this stunted image of
our nation as a land that can afford one of two dreams-liberty or equity-but cannot
manage both." KoZOL, supra note 60, at 173.
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
The Sheff case forced the court to reflect on the hardest questions
left in the educational equity debate: Does attendance at a segregated
school violate a child's right to an equal educational opportunity no
matter how these segregative conditions have arisen? Does the
Brown conclusion that separate educational facilities for minority and
nonminority students are "inherently unequal" 86 have any continuing
resonance for a state court deciding this issue under its own constitu-
tion's equal protection guarantees? Can a state court be expected to
rule against majoritarian will and order a mandatory metropolitan-
wide remedy for metropolitan-wide segregation, a remedy which no
other state official in his right mind would support and no federal
court since Milliken has had the courage or wisdom to impose?
Certainly the challenge to the lower court in Sheff was great. But
great also was the opportunity to say in a clear state voice, "the em-
peror has no clothes." Meaningful progress in desegregation has not
occurred since the early seventies87 when many court-ordered plans
were implemented in the South, in spite of the fact that many of those
plans have been successful and have provided voluminous research
evidence in support of those successes.88 Outside of these enclaves of
success, however, the realities of a minority child's life remain remark-
ably unchanged. As many scholars have noted, the goal of racial inte-
gration has not yet been achieved; educational opportunity is still
dependant on where a child happens to live.89 Over forty years after
Brown, 63.3% of all black children still attend segregated schools,90
and in twenty-five of the nation's largest inner-city school districts,.
more racially segregated schools exist today than in 1954.91
In Connecticut, where black students account for only 12.1% of
the school-aged population, 60.3% attend segregated schools located
in the inner cities, which are, in many cases, poorly equipped and
maintained.92 Over the past four years, this author visited numerous
86. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
87. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 573.
88. See infra Part III(b) for a discussion of these results and a description of some of
the outcomes in successfully desegregated districts.
89. See James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 573; KOZOL, supra note 60, passim;
Dormont, supra note 79, at 264.
90. See James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 573 (citing ANDREW HACKER, Two NA-
TIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 162 (1992)). The authors also
point out that these statistics only refer to African-American children. l Integration for
other minorities has never really begun.
91. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 573 (citing Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the
Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285, 1285 (1992)).
92. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 575 n.256.
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schools in Connecticut and made several trips to the South to study
five counties which have succeeded in their 20-year investment in de-
segregation plans. Their cities and their schools are safe and produc-
tive, while Connecticut's are often dangerous and filled with despair.93
This present-day reality serves as a compelling reminder of Professor
Kahn's warning that "[a] democracy that does not debate the legal
boundaries of its own political choices is already failing the constitu-
tional project. 94
The lower court in Sheff failed to take up its "independent re-
sponsibility" to interpret the Connecticut Constitution in light of to-
day's realities.95 Now, the Connecticut Supreme Court has the
opportunity to criticize the restricted constitutional vision of the fed-
eral courts upon which the lower court's decision was based, and to
develop an independent state approach to metropolitan-wide school
segregation which might help to resolve, rather than perpetuate, one
of our society's most persistent and destructive problems.
This Article develops an alternative analytical approach to the
assignment of state responsibility in school desegregation cases and
proposes a pathway which state courts might utilize in responding to
the issues raised in such cases with a clear, state voice. In Part II(a), I
recommend that a state court construing the provisions of its own con-
stitution reject the federal standard in school desegregation cases for
several reasons: because the current federal approach to the assess-
ment of governmental responsibility in such cases is based on an ar-
guably flawed legal theory; because it is not mandated by either the
United States Constitution or federal precedent; and because it has
proven inadequate to the task of providing a satisfactory remedy to
metropolitan-wide segregation. In Part II(b), I argue that state courts
should also reject the federal approach because it has evolved from
the federal courts' concern for federalism, the state action require-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other institutional and func-
tional differences which are wholly irrelevant to and do not limit the
power of state courts to resolve issues under state constitutional
provisions.
93. See infra Part I11(b) for a discussion of the outcomes produced by successfully
desegregated schools.
94. Kahn, supra note 19, at 1155.
95. "State constitutions must ... be construed to relate open-ended constitutional lan-
guage to modem-day reality.... [S]tate judges bear an independent responsibility for
making state constitutions adaptable to current conditions." Peters, State Constitutional
Law, supra note 72, at 586.
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
In Part III(a), I propose an independent, state constitutional ap-
proach to the issues presented in the Sheff case. This approach is
based on the need in school desegregation cases for an effects-based
jurisprudence focused on the segregative conditions themselves and
the possibilities for resolving them-an approach fully supported by
the express language of Connecticut's own equal protection guaran-
tees and the Connecticut case law construing those guarantees. Such
an approach is equally available to all state courts deciding such cases
under their own constitutions. In Part III(b), I argue that school de-
segregation has proven successful in areas of the country where it has
been "done right," and review the results of empirical research studies
that affirm the value of racially balanced schools to both minority and
nonminority students, as well as to our society at large.
Ha. The Failed Federal Standard
In the early 1970s, two United States Supreme Court cases
pointed toward an enlightened school desegregation doctrine in which
courts moved away from condemning only those cases of segregation
where assignments were explicitly race-based to a result-oriented ap-
proach that focused on segregative conditions and their effects. 96 In
Green v. County School Board,97 the Court invalidated a presumedly
race-neutral student assignment plan based on "freedom-of-choice,"
where the result of the plan was continued racial segregation.98 The
Court expanded this approach in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education,99 by declaring "geographic proximity" an imper-
missible basis for student assignment because the plan did not "work"
in diminishing the segregated condition of the schools, 00 and by or-
dering the Board of Education to achieve the "greatest possible de-
gree" of actual desegregation that it could with an interdistrict
remedy.' 0'
Many commentators at the time would have agreed with Profes-
sor Owen Fiss that
the net effect of [Swann was] to move school desegregation doc-
trine further along the continuum toward a result-oriented ap-
96. Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern
School Desegregation, 38 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 697, 704-05 (1971) [hereinafter Charlotte-
Mecklenburg].
97. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
98. lL at 441-42.
99. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
100, Ia at 20.
101. Id. at 26.
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proach .... [In] retrospect, [Swann] will then be viewed, like
Green, as a way-station to the adoption of a general approach to
school desegregation which, by focusing on the segregated pat-
terns themselves, is more responsive to the school segregation of
the North.10 2
Two factors, one internal and the other external, conspired
against the continuation of this trend: first, the language of the cases
themselves; and second, a new process-based theory of constitutional
law then gaining ascendancy in the academy and the courts.
Although Swann is, in part, result-oriented and enormously pro-
ductive in terms of remedy, that case carried within it the seeds of a
doctrinal trend which veered away from a focus on segregated condi-
tions and back toward a focus on past discriminatory practices. Pro-
fessor Fiss noted the danger in this element of the Court's approach
but discounted it for two reasons. First, he believed that, although the
Court had spoken in terms of causation and past discrimination in
Swann, their real concern was the segregated pattern of school attend-
ance which still existed in Mecklenberg County. 0 3 Otherwise such an
"all-out" remedy could not be defended.'04 Second, the Court's the-
ory of causation "seemed contrived."'0 5 As in all of the southern de-
segregation cases, the evidence of past discrimination could hardly be
refuted. Nevertheless, there is no language in Swann which reveals an
attempt to determine the degree to which past discrimination has led
to current segregative conditions. 0 6 Rather, Professor Fiss believes,
the Court used past discrimination as a "'trigger' . . . for a cannon,"
the all-out desegregation remedy, as well as a way to "preserve the
continuity with Brown and add a moral quality to its decision." 7 Ad-
ditionally, Professor Fiss predicted that the result-oriented language
of Swann would outlive the past discrimination/causal link require-
ment since the Court would be unable to treat segregated conditions
in northern and southern schools differently:
A complicated analysis of causation might ... serve to justify the
differential treatment afforded these otherwise identical pat-
terns. But such an analysis is not likely to be understood or
even believed by most people. And no national institution can
afford to be unresponsive to the popular pressures likely to be
102. Fiss, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra note 96, at 704-05.






engendered by an appearance of differential treatment of cer-
tain regions of the country.'08
Immediately following Swann, these confident predictions of a
trend toward a result-oriented jurisprudence in school desegregation
cases seemed well-founded. District courts, while paying heed to the
discriminatory intent/causal link element of the Court's decision,
found these requirements to be easily satisfied in a variety of creative
ways, such as finding government responsibility in cases where a seg-
regated condition is the foreseeable and avoidable consequence of
government action,10 9 or when government has failed to act when
under a duty to do so, even if no actual causal link to discriminatory
animus could be proved." 0 Some courts adopted the burden-shifting
approach taken in Swann, where, once the plaintiff had shown a segre-
gated condition existed, the State was forced to prove that its actions
had not caused that condition to be created or maintained."'
This jurisprudential trend might have continued had an external
factor not intervened: a new process-based theory of constitutional
law.'1 2 Those espousing this theory maintained that in a democratic
society, essentially nondemocratic institutions such as courts should
108. I&
109. 1d at 706. See also infra notes 250-251 and accompanying text.
110. Fiss, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra note 96, at 706-07. As Professor Fiss has said in
another context, "An individual who starts a boulder rolling down a hill is responsible for
the expected consequences; but the individual who gives the boulder the initial shove and
at the same time possesses the power to stop it, or at least deflect it, at any point on its
journey down the hill, is even more responsible for the outcome." Owen M. iss, Racial
Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 585
(1965) [hereinafter Fiss, Constitutional Concepts].
111. This burden-shifting approach was also used by the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Horton v. Meskill (Horton III), 486 A.2d 1099, 1110 (Conn. 1985).
112. Many commentators participated in the "process-based" dialogue in the 1970s and
1980s. Among the leading proponents were ALEXANDER BICKEL, whose book, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS, was pub-
lished in 1962. In his other books, such as THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975) and THE
JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT (1984), Bickel expanded on his theories of
judicial review (the public value theory, the procedural value theory, and the political
value theory), all of which stressed the prudence of conservatism in judicial decisions.
Another influential member of the "process-based" theory group was JOHN H. ELY,
whose book, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980), was
enormously influential, along with many of his articles, such as Legislative and Administra-
tive Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Constitutionality of Re-
verse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CH. L. R.Ev. 723 (1974); Supreme Court 1977 Term-
Foreword. On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Toward a Rep-
resentation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978); Constitutional
Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. LJ. 399 (1978). Ely's theory of judicial
review conceived the role of courts to be that of merely perfecting the procedural precon-
ditions for a representative democracy.
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avoid reviewing the substance or the fairness of governmental deci-
sionmaking and should intervene only if the decisionmaking process
had become adulterated. 113 In equal protection terms, this adultera-
tion was seen as resulting from forbidden discriminatory
motivations." 4
The rapid ascendancy of process-based theories in the scholarly
literature coincided with the beginning of a period of retrenchment in
the Supreme Court which occurred precisely at the time the Court
decided the first "northern" school desegregation case in 1973. In
Keyes v. School District No. 1,11 5 the Court held that the desegregation
remedies approved in Swann were equally applicable to northern
school districts which had never been segregated by law, but only
where local officials had pursued deliberately segregative policies.
116
Keyes was followed by Milliken v. Bradley,1 7 in which the Court
rejected a metropolitan-wide desegregation remedy for Detroit, hold-
ing that "it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state
or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a sub-
stantial cause of interdistrict segregation.""'  This rejection left un-
corrected the vestiges of school segregation that the lower courts had
found in Detroit, vestiges which the Supreme Court had ordered re-
moved "root and branch" throughout the South. 19
The final pieces of the current Court's equal protection doctrine
were put into place with three cases which left no doubt as to the
emerging doctrinal trend. First, in Washington v. Davis,120 the Court
held that in the absence of a racially discriminatory motive or pur-
pose, a facially neutral governmental action, which has an adverse ra-
113. Many commentators such as Paul Kahn have criticized this process-based ap-
proach to judicial review. Professor Kahn observes that the current federal approach to
constitutional analysis narrows the constitutional vision of the federal courts, but it need
not affect state courts in the same way if they re-enter the constitutional dialogue with an
independent voice. Kahn, supra note 19, at 1152. Professor Kahn would agree, I think,
that to narrow the reach of courts by viewing them as nonmajoritarian institutions misun-
derstands their fundamental role in our democratic system, where "[c]onstitutional dis-
course is the inquiry into the legal boundaries of majoritarian choice." Id. at 1160
(emphasis added).
114. See generally Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1105 (1989).
115. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
116. Id. at 213.
117. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
118. Id. at 744-45.
119. Id. at 780 (White, J., dissenting). See also Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
437-38 (1968).
120. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
cial impact, such as the use of screening tests in hiring, will not be
subject to strict scrutiny."' 1 Second, in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,"2 the Court held
that race must be shown to be a motivating factor in the refusal to
rezone land for low-income housing and that disproportionate impact
alone would not satisfy the intent standard.- 3 And finally, in Person-
nel Administrator v. Feeney,"4 the Court refused to import into equal
protection jurisprudence the familiar doctrine that a person intends
the natural and foreseeable consequences of voluntary actions, a doc-
trine which had been used productively by district courts in satisfying
the intent/causation requirement in school desegregation cases."
Over time, these and other federal court decisions imposing a dis-
criminatory intent/causation standard, have had a devastating effect
on the Brown desegregation mandate. Since the mid-1970s, some
plaintiffs have successfully proved a constitutional violation based on
discriminatory intent, although most commentators would agree that
their task has been made inordinately more difficult." 6 Courts have
ordered desegregation plans implemented in Dayton, 27 Columbus,28
Yonkers,"29 Kansas City, 30 and a few other cities since that time. But
because of the Court's refusal to countenance a metropolitan-wide
remedy in Detroit, all cases following Milliken have restricted the
remedy to the cities themselves, where most of the minorities affected
by the vestiges of segregation still reside. This has made actual deseg-
regation virtually impossible to achieve and has hastened the flight of
urban, White families to the contiguous suburbs where school districts
have been effectively insulated by Milliken from any unwanted incur-
sions by minorities.
Faced with findings of constitutional violations and prevented
from ordering the only remedy which has proven successful in signifi-
121. l at 246-48.
122. 429 U.S. 252 (1977)..
123. Id at 270-71.
124. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
125. Id at 278.
126. See generally Robert A. Sadler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milli-
ken-On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975
WASH. U. L.Q. 535; Leonard P. Strickman, School Desegregation at the Crossroads, 76 Nw.
U. L. REv. 725 (1975).
127. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
128. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
129. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d. Cir. 1987).
130. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct 2038
(1995), for the subsequent High Court ruling on this remedy.
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cantly resolving metropolitan-wide school segregation,' 3' district
courts were left with no option but to order extraordinary expendi-
tures in an attempt to make the city schools equal in quality to subur-
ban schools, 132 an ironic return to the "separate but equal" doctrine
which had been vigorously renounced in Brown.133 Sadly, in no case
have these massive efforts been successful in significantly raising the
level of educational achievement for blacks and other minorities,3
one of the major results achieved by successful metropolitan-wide de-
segregation plans implemented throughout the South.135
Many commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's use of a
discriminatory intent/causation requirement in school desegregation
cases which-in addition to other rationales often used to limit the
reach of judicial remedies such as the de jure/de facto distinction, fed-
eralism concerns, and respect for school district lines and local con-
trol-has become a formidable obstacle to the invalidation of public
policies alleged to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.136 Most, if not
all, of these legal scholars have agreed that such a standard is not im-
plied or required by the general language of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 37 Nor was it required under
prior federal case law, which generally held intent to be irrelevant in
131. See infra Part III(b) for full discussion of this point.
132. See, e.g., Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 57.
133. 348 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
134. The Kansas City case is perhaps the most striking example of this phenomenon:
many years of effort and $1.5 billion expended to create some of the nation's most splendid
schools, produced virtually no progress in student achievement. Having set in motion a
series of acts doomed to failure, the Supreme Court informed us just last year in Missouri
v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995), that gains in student achievement will no longer be seen
as a necessary test in deciding whether or not to release a district from federal court super-
vision. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 75-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. See infra Part III(b) for discussion of research findings.
136. See Gayle Binion, Intent and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. Cr.
REv. 397; Owen M. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Anti-discrimination
Law in the Second Decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. Ci-. L. REv. 742
(1974); Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275 (1972); James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: 'All-Out'
School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1463 (1990); Eric S. Stein, Attacking
School Desegregation Root and Branch, 99 YALE L.J. 2003 (1990); and LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrrTIONAL LAW 1436-1672 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW]; Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Pro-
cess-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) [hereinafter Tribe, Constitu-
tional Theories]; Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers
Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Tribe, Constitu-
tional Physics]. See generally Ortiz, supra note 114.
137. See supra note 136.
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equal protection cases. 138 Other explanations must therefore be pro-
vided for such a radical change in course.
Professor Daniel Ortiz has proposed the theory that several fac-
tors influenced the Court's new approach to equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 139 By the early 1970s, the Court had so
thoroughly fleshed out its "tiers of scrutiny" jurisprudence that results
in equal protection cases had become predictable. 40 Once the groups
deserving strict scrutiny had been recognized, equal protection analy-
sis centered on identifying the group targeted by the governmental
decision.141 This was a fairly simple task when laws discriminated on
their face against protected groups. When government officials began
to use "proxy" classifications-classifications such as wealth and edu-
cation that appear facially neutral but which correlate with race and
other protected classifications-the Court needed an intent require-
ment to uncover these covert, proxy classifications to identify the
proper level of judicial scrutiny 42 This development coincided with
the ascendancy of process-based theories in constitutional law which
required a showing of intentional discrimination in the decisionmak-
ing process to justify court intervention.
As necessary as such a doctrinal development may have been
considered, Professor Ortiz argues that it has not served its purpose
and is in fact applied differently depending on the type of case being
adjudicated. 143 In equal protection cases involving housing and em-
ployment, a plaintiff prevails only with absolute proof of discrimina-
tory motive,144 an approach which protects the cohort classifications
of wealth and education by which such benefits are traditionally allo-
cated.' 45 In cases involving voting and jury selection, benefits not tra-
ditionally allocated by wealth and education, discriminatory intent can
be considered the "cause" of an adverse impact by showing the impact
on an identifiable group combined with either the susceptibility of the
selection process to manipulation (jury selection cases) or discrimina-
tion in other areas of life (voting cases). 46
138. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
139. Ortiz, supra note 114, at 1110-19.
140. Ia at 1116-17.
141. Id at 1117.
142. Id at 1118.
143. Id at 1119.
144. Id at 1107, 1135-40.
145. Id at 1135-40.
146. See id. at 1119, 1126, 1135.
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Ortiz states that in school desegregation cases, the federal dis-
criminatory intent/causation requirement comes into play at three
stages of litigation and is most bizarrely applied.147 At the initial lia-
bility stage, the plaintiff must produce evidence of discriminatory in-
tent occurring at some time between the Brown decision and the
present day.148 Once that has been accomplished by plaintiffs-which
is increasingly hard to do as motivations become more and more at-
tenuated and causal links to current segregated conditions become all
but impossible to discern-the state can rebut such evidence only with
a compelling justification for segregation, a standard which no state
has ever met. 49 Finally, should a plaintiff prevail in establishing lia-
bility, the state is under an affirmative duty to achieve a unitary sys-
tem, and its efforts in this regard are judged solely on the basis of
effect. 150
Ortiz argues that the federal standard becomes even more bur-
densome to plaintiffs after unitariness has been achieved because,
should resegregation occur after the district court has relinquished its
jurisdiction over the case, plaintiffs must then carry the burden of
showing actual discriminatory motivation in the current decisionmak-
ing process,151 much as plaintiffs are required to do in housing and
employment cases. Needless to say, this approach has not only made
the problem of metropolitan-wide segregation very difficult to rem-
edy, but has also made it virtually impossible to attack de facto
resegregation in areas where the original problem had previously been
alleviated.'52
There are other problems inherent in the discriminatory intent/
causation approach, not the least of which is its failure to properly
take note of the effect of unconscious racism in the decisionmaking
process. Professor Charles Lawrence is one of many commentators
who have written on this phenomenon: "Traditional notions of intent
do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are influ-
enced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither in-
tentional ... nor unintentional .... [A] large part of the behavior that





152. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992),
is exemplary in this regard. See supra note 83.
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produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial
motivation."'1 5
3
Professor Lawrence argues that Americans share a common cul-
tural heritage in which racism has played a dominant role.'5 4 Out of
this shared heritage has developed a common belief system containing
certain "tacit understandings" of which we are largely unaware.'5
Because these beliefs and understandings are so widespread in society
and are rarely directly taught, we are not as likely to be conscious of
the fact that we harbor them.'5 6 Even if such beliefs do surface occa-
sionally, they are quickly refused recognition because they conflict
with a shared moral code which rejects such thoughts as "racist":
In short, requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation
as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is
race-dependent ignores much of what we understand about how
the human mind works .... The [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause
requires the elimination of governmental decisions that take
race into account without good and important reasons. There-
fore, equal protection doctrine must find a way to come to grips
with unconscious racism. 157
Professor Laurence Tribe has criticized federal doctrine as ap-
plied in school desegregation cases on the same grounds.' 58 Rather
than contracting the judicial role in cases of de facto segregation, Pro-
fessor Tribe believes it should be expanded, precisely because the ex-
act motivations, purposes, intentions, and causes of such segregation
are so difficult to discern. Professor Tribe sees little difference be-
tween the harm which results from either de jure or de facto segrega-
tion. He agrees that in de facto cases, discriminatory intent, which is
likely to be more "present than provable," often results from an un-
conscious racism which is the legacy of our segregated history. 59
Tribe suggests that until this legacy recedes, "judicially compelled inte-
gration may be the only acceptable response to the high probability of
governmental prejudice and corruption behind all segregation. '1 60
153. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987).
154. la at 322-23.
155. Id.
156. Id at 323.
157. Id.
158. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 136, at 1500.
159. Id.
160. Id. For other scholars in agreement on this point, see generally Goodman, supra
note 136 and Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Conse-
quences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. & EDuc. 3 (1977).
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Many other commentators have criticized the current federal ap-
proach on the grounds that it has developed from a form of legal anal-
ysis which seeks to identify wrongdoers and hold them responsible for
"causing" harm to a protected group.' 6' Professor Tribe has identified
the problem as one resulting from reliance on "antidiscrimination" as
the mediating principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause.162
Because discrimination is defined as an "act based on prejudice,"'163
the finding of discrimination requires that we identify both an actor
and an act based on invidious motivation. Further, because the focus
is on the "perpetrator,"'' 6 this leads inexorably to the state action,
discriminatory intent, and causation standards under the Fourteenth
Amendment currently employed by federal courts and, therefore, to
the results in Washington v. Davis, Milliken, and other cases.
In each case, Professor Tribe asserts, the Supreme Court has
noted the disparate, harmful effect on the victim, and then focused on
the discriminatory motives of the particular actor instead of the Con-
stitution's more proper focus, i.e., the harmful impact on a protected
group. 65 Professor Tribe suggests that at the present stage, when the
problems have become so entrenched that intent/causation is almost
impossible to prove, a far better mediator for equal protection pur-
poses would be the "antisubjugation principle, which aims [not at
preventing discriminatory acts of wrongdoers, but rather] to break
down legally created or legally reenforced systems of subordination
that treat some people as second-class citizens."' 66
Professor James Liebman raises similar concerns. He describes
the Court's movement in desegregation cases from reliance on the
equal educational opportunity or integration theories in the 1950s and
1960s-which tended to focus on remedying the effects of government
decisionmaking-to what he terms the "Correction Theory," which
focuses on the evil acts of wrongdoers.167 The moral imperative of the
Correction Theory is identical to that which motivates the law of torts,
that is, a "'deep sense of common law morality that one who hurts
161. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1501-20; OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIvI RIGHTS INJUNC-
TION passim (1978) [hereinafter Fiss, CIVIL RIGHrs]; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court
1978 Term: Foreword. The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1-23 (1979) [hereinafter
Fiss, 1978 Term].
162. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 136, at 1514.
163. Id. at 1515.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. See infra Part III(a) for an application of this antisubjugation principle to
school desegregation under the Connecticut Constitution.
167. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1501.
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another should compensate him."' 1 6 8 In the desegregation context,
this theory translates into the "'strong moral claim that purposeful
discrimination is a wrong whose effects must be eradicated."' 1 69
Professor Liebman argues that the courts have found the tort
analogy-which fits in neatly with process-based theories-appealing
because "it is simple, individualistic, and by hypothesis nonredistribu-
tive.' 170 Ultimately, however, private law solutions to public law
problems are inherently unsatisfying and ineffective. In particular,
they fail to respond satisfactorily to the victims of entrenched metro-
politan-wide school segregation and other forms of racial discrimina-
tion for the same reasons that private tort law fails to deal
satisfactorily with the victims of mass toxic tort disasters. 7'
Professor Liebman draws convincing analogies between the two
cases. He argues that "[t]he complicated character and massive scale
of the problem in both situations cause the correctively critical prereq-
uisites of an identifiable plaintiff and an identifiable defendant to
elude proof, notwithstanding that unjustly enriched wrongdoers al-
most certainly have visited harms on large numbers of victims."' 72 As
a result, in both the mass toxic tort and school segregation contexts,
the supposed moral integrity of the compensatory system
"evaporates."' 173
Tort scholars have drawn attention to the problems of victims of
cancer who can prove beyond doubt their exposure to a toxic agent
that is known to increase the incidence of cancer in the population but
which may be only one of many "causes" of the victims' cancers.' 74
Typically, these plaintiffs can also show that the agent was produced at
a given time by one or several chemical companies, but cannot prove
which companies. Professor Liebman argues that the case of residen-
tially and educationally segregated minority children is similar, in that
they can show "exposure" to myriad acts of school, housing and other
government officials, any one of which, in addition to a number of so-
called "neutral factors,"' 75 may have resulted in their attendance in
168. IL (quoting Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. Rnv.
1401, 1412 (1961)).
169. Id. (quoting Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the
Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 729 (1986)).
170. Id. at 1502 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 1518-19.
172. IA at 1519.
173. Id
174. See, e.g., PETER H. ScHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS
IN THE COURTS 3-15 (1986).
175. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1519.
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segregated schools, but they cannot pinpoint which factor or actor
may have "caused" their harm. Liebman sees the problem in both
cases as being the near impossibility of proving "specific causation of
injuries that regrettably, are not substance- or discrimination-
specific."' 76
Professor Liebman concludes that rather than resolving the
problems suffered by victims in both cases, the traditional tort ap-
proach merely allows a court to engage in "an ostrich-like avoidance
of them.' 1 77 He favors the abandonment of the Correction Theory in
federal equal protection jurisprudence, 78 but, curiously, argues for
the retention of some form of the intent standard, even though he
admits that to do so makes the problem of metropolitan-wide segrega-
tion nearly impossible to resolve.179
Many commentators agree that it would be better by far to aban-
don the tort model completely since it has failed to eliminate a soci-
ety-wide harm in any but the most ad hoc and arbitrary fashion.
Under the current federal approach, the Court appears to be saying to
plaintiffs, "if you can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a
given actor's discriminatory animus during the decisionmaking pro-
cess caused the harm you are currently suffering, in an era in which a
reluctant society is ever more skillful at disguising such animus and
obliterating the causal links, then we will use the full force of declara-
tory and injunctive relief .to remedy your suffering. If you fail to sur-
mount this burden, however, we must turn a blind eye to your
suffering." This is exactly the approach taken by the lower court in
Sheff.
Professor Tribe has offered compelling criticism of this particular
result of the current federal approach: "A corollary of responsible
modernism is to admit that we can see more than we can do. But this
does not mean that we should lie about what we see."'180 He argues
that by utilizing a reference point of detached neutrality to selectively
reach into society, make a few fine-tuning adjustments, and step back
out, the federal courts are ignoring the lesson of modern quantum
mechanics which tells us that the act of observing always affects what
is being observed, and that the observer is never really "detached"
from the system being studied.'' "The results courts announce-the
176. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
177. Id. at 1521 (quoting Sc-ucK, supra note 174, at 267-68).
178. Id at 1523.
179. Id at 1663.
180. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 38.
181. Id. at 13, 20.
ways they view the legal terrain and what they say about it-will in
turn have continuing effects that reshape the nature of what the courts
initially undertook to review .... "I'
Professor Tribe points out that the current perception that "white
flight" is the result of purely private choices by individuals, and there-
fore beyond the power of courts to remedy, has resulted from a series
of Supreme Court decisions which, until recently in Freeman v. Pitts,
did not purport to establish such a principle. 83 Taken together, Tribe
suggests that Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'8 Swann, Milliken, and even
Brown (due to its original focus on the school district rather than the
state as the responsible party), say in effect that White parents have
the "'inherent right' to keep [their] children in [W]hite, affluent
schools by moving to a suburban school district."' 85 Professor Fiss has
also recognized that the clear, legitimating message of a state's rigid
adherence to geographic criteria for school attendance is to say to the
parents who do not want their children to attend an integrated school,
"this desire can be fulfilled by moving to a [W]hite neighborhood.' 8 6
Tribe criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken as a fail-
ure to create a rights/remedy dialogue which might have eventually
located a solution to the problem of metropolitan-side segregation.18 7
Counselling abandonment of the current federal approach to equal
protection in general, and school desegregation cases in particular,
Professor Tribe reminds us that even so-called neutral acts can have
"racially separationist consequences."'88 A finding of governmental
responsibility for these consequences does not require a court to un-
cover the hidden motives behind governmental action. Instead, courts
should look clearly at "the world government has built" 18 9 and recog-
nize that for some citizens, the equal chance to succeed in that world
has been severely compromised by the structure that government,
perhaps unwittingly, has devised.' 0
182. Id. at 20. Professor Fiss has also observed the power of a court's response in
school desegregation cases to reshape both the legal and societal landscape: "The moral
status of a claim may derive from its legal recognition: morality shaped the judgment in
Brown v. Board of Education and that judgment then shaped our morality." Fiss, CIVIL
RIGHrrs, supra note 161, at 95.
183. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 27.
184. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
185. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 28.
186. Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 587-88.
187. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 30 (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 33 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). See also Fiss, Constitu-
tional Concepts, supra note 110, at 585-87.
189. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 39.
190. Id.
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Professor Tribe agrees with commentators such as Lawrence
Sager, who suggest that when federal courts announce that the state
cannot be held responsible for correcting harmful conditions it has not
intended or caused, they legitimate both the acts of government and
their harmful effects.19' This, in turn, relieves other potential actors of
the responsibility for resolving the problem.192 A far better outcome
would be a federal court's admission that a protected group has been
impermissibly harmed but that the district court has no way to remedy
it, rather than to say no harm has been done, or that the government
is not responsible for finding a remedy. 93 This would leave the way
clear, as Professor Fiss reminds us, for state governments, local school
boards and other agencies-even the Congress of the United States-
to pass laws requiring or inducing states and their local districts to
take steps to eliminate segregation. 194 Both Professor Fiss and Profes-
sor Tribe argue for a theory of government responsibility based on the
government's ability to avoid harmful effects rather than on its intent
to cause such effects. Professor Tribe suggests:
We may all be engulfed by, and dependent upon, the structure
of the law, but we are not all rendered equally vulnerable by it.
If the special dependence upon the law and its omissions that is
experienced by the most vulnerable among us could be dis-
missed as irrelevant because it was not directly created by any
state force targeting such individuals, their heightened depen-
dence might be seen as legally immaterial. But if the systemic
vulnerability of some ... is instead regarded as centrally rele-
vant to how the law's shape should be understood, then one is
more likely at least to ask whether the legal system's very failure
to do more for such persons might not work an unconstitutional
deprivation of their rights.' 95
State courts need not be held hostage to a federal model which
has failed to provide many of their most vulnerable citizens with an
adequate basis for an autonomous and successful life. In Sheff, the
Connecticut Supreme Court, independently construing its own equal
protection provisions and pursuing its own constitutional values,
should abandon the failed federal model in school desegregation cases
in toto and at last put flesh on the bare bones of Connecticut's de-
clared fundamental right to an equal educational opportunity.
191. Id. at 33-34 (citing Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure. The Legal Status of Under-
enforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978)).
192. Id.
193. Fiss, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra note 96, at 708.
194. Id.
195. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 13 (emphasis added).
lb. The Fundamental Differences between Federal and State
Constitutional Adjudication
The federal courts comprise a crucial bulwark against evulsive
depredation of constitutional values- but against scattered ero-
sion they are relatively powerless. 96
Like Professor Lawrence Sager, other commentators have ob-
served that, while federal courts have been effective against overt
apartheid, such as Jim Crow laws and "White's only" signs, "[t]he con-
temporary symptoms of inertial and unconscious prejudice are more
subtle"'197 and have proven much more difficult to eradicate. How-
ever, the limitations-some institutional, some doctrinally self-im-
posed-which have hampered the federal courts' remedial efforts in
this arena do not apply to state courts and therefore should not stop
them from articulating a more effective approach.
The current trend of independent state constitutional interpreta-
tions, which extend protections beyond those offered under the Four-
teenth Amendment, has led to a growing perception among judges
and legal scholars that federal Supreme Court decisions, which we
have tended to consider as the end-point of the constitutional deci-
sionmaking process, represent instead the mid-point of an evolving
system.' 98 In this system, if the Court strikes down the state action, it
sets a federal minimum.' 99 But if it upholds the state action, the deci-
sion may precipitate a series of "second-looks" by state deci-
sionmakers in which Supreme Court decisions no longer carry
presumptive validity.2" As Professor Kahn notes, "the mere fact that
a doctrine emerges from the authoritative voice of the Supreme Court
does not make it correct.... In this debate over the meaning and
requirements of law, the Court's voice is never final." 0' 1 There is now
an extensive literature favoring this trend, as well as many state and
federal decisions which attest to its validity. One reason for this
evolving pattern is that state courts are not bound by the same implicit
or explicit institutional limitations which often form the basis of a fed-
eral decision.
196. Sager, supra note 191, at 1263.
197. See, e.g., TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 136, at 1513-14.
198. Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection
of the Supreme Court's Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. Rev. 353, 360 (1984). See also
Brennan, supra note 17; Stanley Mosk, The State Courts, in AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD
CENTURY 213, 220-25 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1976).
199. Williams, supra note 198, at 361.
200. Id.
201. Kahn, supra note 19, at 1155.
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A. The Limitations of Federalism
The first of these limitations is the Court's concern for federalism,
especially in equal protection cases. Professor Tribe believes that the
Supreme Court's deep reservations about the efficacy and legitimacy
of intrusive federal injunctive remedies lie at the base of its decisions
which involve a discriminatory intent/causation requirement.0 2
Often, plaintiffs have sought remedies which, in the Court's view,
would have involved the federal courts too deeply in state or local
matters. This is an institutional concern that is serious and legitimate
but which does not excuse the Court from ignoring the underlying
problem by imposing a threshold test.2 3 Rather than deciding that no
constitutional violation can be shown without evidence of discrimina-
tory intent,2 4 Professor Tribe argues that the federal courts should say
"[t]here is a violation here but institutional considerations prevent us
from providing a remedy. '205
The significance of this very different message is that the problem
is then passed on for resolution to other branches of government
which are equally obliged to uphold constitutional values. State gov-
ernmental entities are not restrained by principles such as federalism
that might limit the power of the federal courts to act in a particular
instance.20 6 In particular, state courts may play a role, vis-a-vis the
other branches of state government, that differs markedly from the
limited "interstitial" role of the federal courts.20 7 Presumably, Profes-
sor Tribe would approve of the Supreme Court's decision in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigue208 which, while de-
nying a basis for a fundamental right to education under the United
States Constitution, clearly stated that their decision was not to be
viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo,20 9 thus im-
plicitly inviting state courts to resolve the issue without being bur-
dened by federalist concerns.
This invitation was understood perfectly by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in finding a fundamental right to an equal educational
opportunity under the Connecticut Constitution in Horton.210 As
202. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 136, at 1510-12.
203. Id at 1512.
204. Id
205. Id at 1513.
206. Id
207. Id
208. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
209. Id. at 58.
210. 376 A.2d 359, 371 (Conn. 1977).
Chief Justice Peters, dissenting in Pellegrino v. O'Neill,"1 ' explained:
"We are free to consider this matter unencumbered by the considera-
tions of federalism which have led federal courts to doubt the propri-
ety of federal intervention in the administration of state judicial
systems. 212
B. The State Action Requirement
A second limitation on federal constitutional analysis is the state
action requirement which federal courts have derived from the "No
state shall.. ." language of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition
to the obvious lack of any such limiting, state-specific language in
either of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Connecticut Constitu-
tion,21 3 there is an even more fundamental reason for not importing a
state action requirement into state constitutional decisionmaking: the
purpose served by that requirement in interpreting the Federal Con-
stitution does not exist in the state context.
The original purpose of the state action requirement was to shield
some portion of state sovereignty from the broad reach of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Professor Martin Margulies sees the requirement
of state action as a shorthand expression used by federal courts in
balancing the interests of a complainant against those of an alleged
wrongdoer, while showing due deference to the interest of the state
"in resolving the conflict without federal interference." '14 This state
interest factor is missing in state court adjudication.
Chief Justice Peters, dissenting in Cologne v. Westfarms Associ-
ates,21 5 argued that the state action requirement was designed by the
federal courts to address the demands of federalism by creating space
for state regulation.1 6 According to Chief Justice Peters, there is no
basis for a state action requirement under state constitutions because
this "federalism component" is missing.217 However, she asserts that
if the state courts should decide to devise a state action requirement
independently, it should be applied more flexibly than under federal
law and be "more readily found for a claim of racial discrimina-
211. 480 A.2d 476 (Conn. 1984).
212. Id. at 488.
213. See supra note 66.
214. Martin B. Margulies, A Lawyer's View of the Constitution, 15 CONN. L. REV. 107,
111 (1982).
215. 469 A.2d 1201, 1210 (Conn. 1984).
216. Id. at 1218 (citing Tribe, Constitutional Theories, supra note 136, at 1149-50).
217. 469 A.2d at 1218.
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tion."''21 In reaching her conclusions, Chief Justice Peters drew on
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center2" and several decisions by
other courts220 that refused to impose a state action requirement on
state constitutional decisionmaking.
Therefore, when the Sheff defendants assert that the plaintiffs
cannot proceed without first satisfying the state action requirement,
they are invoking a federal doctrine devised by federal courts for fed-
eral purposes under the Fourteenth Amendment. Technically, there is
no state action requirement under any state constitution.
In Connecticut, this last assertion could be based solely on the
different language of the federal and state provisions, a difference
which many state courts have used persuasively to avoid implying a
state action requirement into state constitutional adjudication. But
even if the language of the state and federal provisions were exactly
the same, many scholars and jurists would agree that there would be
no inherent reason for state courts to read that language as requiring
the same interpretation that their federal counterparts have given
it."2i As Justice Berdon of the Connecticut Supreme Court has ob-
served, "even when state and federal provisions have identical lan-
guage, the state charter may require more protection."'"'-
An increasing number of state courts have construed state consti-
tutions and state bills of rights as guaranteeing more protection than
the federal provisions, even if identical in wording. Justice Brennan
cites several cases in New Jersey, Hawaii, Michigan, South Dakota,
Maine, and other states as examples of this phenomenon.223 In partic-
ular, he refers to these words of the California Supreme Court:
We... declare that [the decision to the contrary of the United
States Supreme Court] is not persuasive authority in any state
prosecution in California .... We pause . . . to reaffirm the
independent nature of the California Constitution and our re-
sponsibility to separately define and protect the rights of Cali-
fornia citizens, despite conflicting decisions of the United States
Supreme Court interpreting the Federal Constitution.' 24
218. Id.
219. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
220. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores
Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983).
221. Williams, supra note 198, at 389-90; Brennan, supra note 17, at 495.
222. Berdon, supra note 28, at 205-206. See also Peters, supra note 72, at 585. See, e.g.,
People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 846 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (declaring death penalty statute
facially invalid under state Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, despite fact that it was
identical to its federal counterpart).
223. Brennan, supra note 17, at 499-501.
224. People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280-81 (Cal. 1976).
Nor are United States Supreme Court statements, such as those
in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,2' that state courts are free
to interpret their constitutions to expand constitutional rights as they
see fit, the source of state power in this regard. It is now widely ac-
cepted that a state constitution is an independent source of rights, to
be interpreted on its own terms. 26 Chief Justice Peters has asserted
that "[u]nder our federal system of dual sovereignty, state constitu-
tions embody the reservation to the states of all residual power not...
conferred upon the federal government. State courts therefore must
be empowered to determine, in light of state interests and state his-
tory, what meaning to attribute to provisions contained in state
constitutions." 2 7
Not only are federal court decisions not the source of a state's
power to interpret its own constitution, but the notion that state con-
stitutional provisions were intended to mirror the federal provisions
does not comport with history. A historical analysis of the federal Bill
of Rights reveals that the drafters drew from provisions of the already
existing state constitutions. s28 Additionally, the bills of rights of the
various states continued to play the crucial role in limiting govern-
mental abuse even after the federal constitution was written because,
until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal Bill of
Rights was held to be inapplicable to the states.229 Therefore, as Jus-
tice Brennan noted, Supreme Court decisions "are not, and should not
be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counter-
part provisions of state law." 0
In sum, the institutional limitations on federal courts that pro-
duced the state action requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment
provide Connecticut courts with ample reasons to reject the use of a
225. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
226. The majority opinion in Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 469 A.2d 1201, 1206
(Conn. 1984), reaffirms this principle for Connecticut by relying on State v. Ferrell, 463
A.2d 573, 578 n.12 (Conn. 1983), Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State, 441 A.2d 16, 20 n.3 (Conn.
1981), Fasulo v. Arafeh, 378 A.2d 553, 554 (Conn. 1977), and Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d
359, 371 (Conn. 1977).
227. Peters, supra note 72, at 588. See also Berdon, supra note 28, at 206; Kauger, supra
note 18, at 17 (citing Turner v. City of Lawton, 733 P.2d 375, 378-79 (Okla. 1986)); Peters,
Evolving Federal System, supra note 32, at 23. See generally Brennan, supra note 17; Kahn,
supra note 19; and Robert A. Burt, Brown's Reflection, 103 YALE L.J. 1483 (1994).
228, See Robert F. Williams, Experience Must Be Our Only Guide: The State Constitu-
tional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15 HASrNoS CONST. L.Q. 403,
403-04 (1988).
229. Brennan, supra note 17, at 502.
230. Id. See generally WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., The Bill of Rights and the States, in
THE GREAT RIGrrs 65 (Edmond N. Cahn ed., 1963).
Winter 19961 STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
386 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:351
state action requirement in Connecticut equal protection cases, the
most fundamental being that a state action requirement has no basis
in the substantive Connecticut constitutional guarantee of equality.
C. Institutional and Functional Differences
Federal doctrine is also dictated in part by other institutional limi-
tations which do not hamper state courts. First, United States
Supreme Court decisions must operate in all areas of the nation and
must, therefore, represent the lowest common denominator of rights
protection. Second, the doctrine of selective incorporation used for
applying the Bill of Rights to the states leads to questions regarding
the dilution of those rights in a state context.231 Third, as Justice
Brennan observed, "state courts that rest their decisions wholly or
even partly on state law need not apply federal principles of standing
and justiciability that deny litigants access to the Courts. '2 32
Furthermore, some commentators have noted significant func-
tional differences between federal and state courts which militate
against the adoption of a federal approach to state constitutional
questions. First, state courts are often deeply involved in the state
policymaking process, which implies a very different institutional posi-
tion from that of the United States Supreme Court. Legislators and
state judges are, in a very real sense, "partners in the business of plan-
ning for the welfare of the state. '233 Second, a state court's judicial
function is often quite different. State courts perform a great deal of
nonconstitutional lawmaking, a power which federal courts have been
denied since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.2 4 As Professor Robert
Williams has observed, state supreme courts can effectively make law
through their rulemaking powers, as well as exercising a variety of
"inherent powers" unknown by their federal counterparts.235
Chief Justice Peters has also stressed the significant differences
between the pursuit of constitutional business in the Supreme Court
in Washington and the high courts of the various states. For example,
federal and state courts do not share the same constitutional heritage
nor do they rely on the same methodology to reach their constitu-
tional decisions. In addition, to a far greater degree than federal
judges, state court judges are publicly accountable for their decisions
231. Williams, supra note 198, at 389-91.
232. Brennan, supra note 17, at 501.
233. Peters, Evolving Federal System, supra note 32, at 22.
234. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
235. Williams, supra note 198, at 399.
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because they are not appointed for life, either being elected by state
citizens or appointed to their terms in office with the approval of the
legislature.2 36 This greater public accountability could be said to give
state courts greater weight as democratic institutions than their fed-
eral counterparts.
In addition to the fact that state constitutional provisions may dif-
fer qualitatively from their federal counterparts, other "nonrights"
provisions of state constitutions may differ from provisions of the fed-
eral constitution so greatly as to profoundly change the balance of
power in state government. For example, many state constitutions
contain provisions enlarging judicial authority at the expense of the
legislature.237 Also, the text of a state constitution may explicitly pro-
vide for judicial review of legislative and executive action.238 In fact,
judicial review was a phenomenon of state law long before Marbury v.Madison,239 and contrary to the federal experience, most judiciary
provisions of state constitutions have been revised and ratified in this
century without a serious struggle over the exercise of judicial
review. 240
Because of these institutional and functional differences, and nu-
merous others,24' the judicial review exercised by a state court should
be qualitatively and doctrinally different from that which would be
exercised by a federal court. This is particularly true in school deseg-
regation cases where the federal approach has failed to remedy so fun-
damental a societal problem as metropolitan-wide school segregation.
Viewing United States Supreme Court decisions as presumptively
valid for state constitutional analysis-the view apparently held by the
lower court in Sheff and expressed in many of the older state cases
when parallel decisionmaking under provisions of both the federal
and state constitutions was the norm-denigrates the importance of
state constitutional jurisprudence. Efforts to limit state decisionmak-
236. Peters, Evolving Federal System, supra note 32, at 21-22.
237. Williams, supra note 198, at 401.
238. The Framers of many of the state constitutions intended judicial review to play a
more significant role than did the Framers of the federal constitution. See Feldman, supra
note 68, at 1062. See generally William E. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Re-
view, The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. Rnv.
1166, 1167 (1972). States continued to see judicial review as a critical state court function
in order to check the powers of state legislatures as part of the Jacksonian era's impetus
toward reform. See James A. Henretta, Foreword Rethinking the State Constitutional Tra-
dition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 833-35 (1991).
239. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
240. See Williams, supra note 198, at 401. See also Feldman, supra note 68, at 1062.
241. Further differences are noted in Williams, supra note 198, at 397-404.
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ing by analytical formulations and doctrines designed to serve the pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal judicial system
constitute an unwarranted delegation of state power to the federal
courts. Moreover, they result in an abdication of state judicial respon-
sibility to provide for some of its most vulnerable citizens "the full
panoply of rights which Connecticut residents have come to expect as
their due. 242
MIa. Developing an Independent Approach to State
Constitutional Decisionmaking
Through a series of events and doctrinal missteps, federal school
desegregation law has moved away from the early promises of
Brown,243 Green,2' and Swann,245 which held the segregated condi-
tion of schools to be an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protec-
tion, and toward a process-oriented jurisprudence which has made
solving the unique problems posed by metropolitan-wide school seg-
regation progressively more difficult through its use of the discrimina-
tory intent barrier.
It would be possible, of course, for a state court to avoid the full
chilling effect of this approach by carving out a narrow path through
the federal jurisprudential wilderness, as was done by some district
courts following Swann. This path could be constructed by adopting a
doctrine of state responsibility based on the foreseeable segregative
consequences of state acts.2 46 The same result could be achieved by
enlarging the categories of evidence deemed relevant in establishing
intent/causation to include "root" evidence, such as community atti-
tudes and their effect on elected officials, and/or "branch" evidence,
such as the decisions of other branches of state government which
have played a part in creating or maintaining a segregated system in
242. Horton, 376 A.2d 359, 371 (Conn. 1977).
243. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
244. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
245. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
246. See Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 584-85 (arguing that a deliber-
ate choice of geographic criteria with knowledge of the probable consequences, combined
with a deliberate "decision not to mitigate the consequences of a prior choice reinforces
the ascription of responsibility") and Robert I. Richter, Note, School Desegregation After
Swann: A Theory of Government Responsibility, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 421, 424-29 (arguing
that segregative intent can easily be shown in facially neutral acts, such as attendance zone
designation or school site location, which have the natural and probable effect of fostering
residential segregation and which may subsequently result in racially imbalanced schools).
See generally Binion, supra note 136; Goodman, supra note 136; Liebman, supra note 136.
both schools and housing.247 The path could also be constructed by
shifting the burden of proof on intent/causation to defendants once
racial isolation has been established by objective criteria, the ap-
proach taken by the Supreme Court in Swann.248 The Connecticut
Supreme Court took a similar burden-shifting approach in Horton.249
One might also argue that current federal doctrine permits the
narrow approaches described above, based on the language in Colum-
bus Board of Education v. Penick.25 ° Penick blurred the de facto/de
jure distinction by suggesting that, even in a city like Columbus which
had no statutorily mandated segregation in this century, disparate ra-
cial impact and foreseeable consequences could be "fertile ground for
drawing inferences of segregative intent," even though they "without
more, do not establish a constitutional violation."25
Even under federal law, the argument has been made that the
considerations often cited by federal courts as justifying a refusal to
recognize an affirmative constitutional duty to act, such as the nega-
tive constitutional language of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state
action requirement, a concern for federalism, and the problem of de-
signing enforceable remedies-do not apply once the state has under-
taken to act.252 This is especially true in the state constitutional
context where many of the constitutional guarantees protect positive
rights, such as the right to an education, which can only be enforced
by legislative action. 53
All of these options are available to state courts seeking to cir-
cumvent federal standards. However, constructing such a pathway
under state law would be a mistake. Instead, since it seems clear that
no objective standard can be devised that will effectively and fairly
determine whether the governmental decisionmaking process had be-
247. See Stein, supra note 136, at 2005; TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 136, at 1500. This was the approach taken by the federal district court in Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 754 (1974).
248. 402 U.S. 1 (1979).
249. 486 A.2d 1099, 1110 (Conn. 1985).
250. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
251. Id. at 464-65.
252. See Goodman, supra note 136, at 357.
253. Feldman has defined a "positive" constitutional right as one which can only be
effectuated through governmental action, whereas a "negative" right is one which can only
be realized when the government does not act. Feldman, supra note 68, at 1057, 1057 n.2
(emphasis added) (citing Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution
of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 883 n.12 (1989)). Most of the constitutional rights
protected under the federal Constitution are negative rights (freedom of speech, religion,
etc.) as opposed to state constitutions which enumerate many positive state rights for state
citizens. Id.
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come tainted by discriminatory motivations, 4 the federal approach
should be rejected completely. State courts in general, and the Con-
necticut Supreme Court in particular in Sheff, should carve out a dis-
tinctive jurisprudence based solely on the original understanding of
Brown and all school desegregation cases prior to Keyes, i.e. that it is
the segregated condition of the schools, and the known harmful ef-
fects of such conditions on the lives of children and their communities,
that constitutes the wrong which must be remedied.
A. The Need for Structural Reform
A state court engaged in independent state constitutional deci-
sionmaking should take note that the goal of school desegregation is
structural reform. According to Professor Fiss,
[S]tructural reform is premised on the notion that the quality of
our social life is affected in important ways by the operation of
large scale organizations .... The structural suit is one in which
a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over values of constitu-
tional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to
eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present institu-
tional arrangements. a5
The question in such cases is not whether the discriminatory acts or
motivations of state officials have "caused" a particular social condi-
tion to exist. In a structural lawsuit, the need to identify such "wrong-
doers" virtually disappears.a 6 Rather, courts must ask whether the
condition itself threatens important constitutional values and whether
an "organizational dynamic" exists that serves to perpetuate that con-
dition.257 If the answers to these judicial inquiries are affirmative, the
cost of reformation can legitimately be placed on the organization. As
Professor Fiss has noted, this assignment of governmental responsibil-
ity is not based on the fact that the organization has "'done wrong' in
either the literal or metaphysical sense" but rather on the realization
that only through structural reform can the "threat to constitutional
values posed by the operation of the organization be removed. ' 258 An
understanding of the need for structural reform in achieving equal ed-
ucational opportunity, as well as the usefulness of the structural in-
junction in reforming the operations of a given bureaucratic
254. Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 575.
255. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 161, at 2.
256. Id. at 22.
257. Id. at 18.
258. Id at 23.
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institution, was expressed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Hor-
ton v. Meskill:
Our own cases have similarly acknowledged that a court, in the
exercise of its discretion to frame injunctive relief, must "bal-
ance the competing interests of the parties" to assure that the
relief it grants is compatible with the equities of the case, and
takes account of the possibility of embarrassment to the opera-
tions of government.259
A school desegregation case is a paradigmatic structural lawsuit
in which the segregated condition of the schools is alleged to violate
the constitutional right of students to equal protection of the laws.
The appropriate remedy in such a case is the structural injunction. As
opposed to preventive or reparative injunctions, the structural injunc-
tion is used to effectuate the reorganization of an ongoing social insti-
tution.260 In a structural injunction context, like a school
desegregation case, it is imperative to see that "[t]he constitutional
wrong is the structure itself; the reorganization is designed to bring
the structure within constitutional bounds. . 261
B. The Need for an Effects-Based Jurisprudence
In a school desegregation case, the court's focus must turn away
from the process by which schools become segregated, toward the seg-
regated condition itself, and the effects of that condition on the lives
of school children, their families, and their communities. This is, in
fact, the constitutional wrong to be remedied because it is the effects
of racial isolation which constitute a per se deprivation of equal pro-
tection and equal educational opportunity.
Under the structural approach advocated by Professor Fiss and
other scholars, government responsibility attaches regardless of intent
or causation when the state fails to remedy the racial imbalance within
its power to avoid. Since the state, in the form of its many intercon-
nected governmental units, has complete control over all aspects of
public education, including the establishment of local school districts
and compulsory attendance rules, the designation of attendance
zones, the creation of student assignment plans, and the development
of school funding schemes, it seems facetious to suggest that the state
cannot be held accountable for the cumulative impact of these deci-
259. 486 A.2d 1099, 1111 (Conn. 1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
260. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 161, at 23-24.
261. OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNcTION 11 (1978).
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sions if they result in segregated conditions which the state has within
its power to correct.262
Feldman has noted that the enforcement of positive state consti-
tutional guarantees calls for primary attention to be placed on the
benefits of government action. The proper inquiry is "What can the
state do to solve the problem?" rather than "What has the state done
to cause the problem? 2 63 State courts are particularly well-suited to
enforce these positive constitutional guarantees because of their ex-
pertise in shaping the common law, their ability to account for unique
local circumstances, and the "democratic imprimatur" enjoyed by
state judges because of their special position of public
accountability.2 4
Professor Tribe has strongly recommended such an effects-based
approach and has advocated a new mediating principle which better
comports with the underlying goal of equal protection.2 65 As dis-
cussed above in Part H(a), Professor Tribe contends that the antidis-
crimination principle, which has been used as an equal protection
mediator for many years in school desegregation cases, requires a
"perpetrator" who engages in the invidious act of discriminating.2 66
This requirement leads inexorably to a jurisprudence based on state
action, discriminatory intent and causation, and the subsequent "trav-
esty" of Milliken. Professor Tribe suggests that, at the present stage, a
far better mediating principle for equal protection cases would be the
antisubjugation principle, which aims not at preventing discriminatory
acts, but rather at breaking down legally reinforced systems of subor-
dination that treat some people as second-class citizens. "The core
value of this principle is that all people have equal worth[,]' '267 which
comes much closer to the core value underlying the principle of equal
protection. Surely, it cannot be said that the original purpose of an
equal protection clause, either at the federal or state level, was to un-
cover "impure thoughts '268 and pursue them. Rather, it seems clear
that such clauses were intended to prevent the systematized subordi-
nation of any group of citizens and to "guarantee a full measure of
262. See Richter, supra note 246, at 440; Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at
587.
263. Feldman, supra note 68, at 1089 ("[W]hen positive rights are at issue legislative
action represents the good and legislative inertia the evil.").
264. Neuborne, supra note 253, at 893-900.
265. See supra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.




human dignity for all."'2 6 9 Under the antisubjugation principle, an
equal protection clause asks whether the particular conditions com-
plained of deprive a particular group of its right to be fully human.27 °
Professor Tribe observes further that the
antidiscrimination principle may be sufficient to contend with
the deprivations of equal protection that result from "isolated
instances of overt impropriety" or "transitory hysteria." But the
subjugation of blacks, women, and other groups that persists to-
day is usually neither isolated nor hysterical .... Regimes of
sustained subordination [] generate "devices, institutions, and
circumstances that impose burdens or constraints on the target
group without resort to repeated or individualized discrimina-
tory actions." 271
The inequities that persist in American society have survived be-
cause they have become ingrained in our modes of thinking.272 As the
United States Supreme Court recognized a century ago in Strauder v.
West Virginia,2 7 habitual discrimination is the hardest to eradicate.
Many commentaries have harshly criticized the United States
Supreme Court's current process-oriented approach to equal protec-
tion because state officials cannot be held responsible for correcting
conditions which violate the constitutional norm of equality unless
they have engaged in a course of conduct with the intent to discrimi-
nate against an identifiable group.27 4 This approach turns a blind eye
toward the harm which can be caused to members of certain groups
when government actors are merely "indifferent to their suffering. "275
Fiss has described the same phenomenon as the "policy of disre-
gard."2 76 Current federal equal protection doctrine merely serves to
legitimate and perpetuate this disregard and is "utterly alien to the
basic concept of equal justice under the law."277
C. The Antisubjugation Principle Applied to Sheff
The use of the antisubjugation principle as an equal protection
mediator allows a court to focus on the denial of humanity which the
269. It
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1518 (quoting Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 828, 834 (1983)).
272. JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 60-66 (1970).
273. 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880).
274. See supra note 136.
275. TRInE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTTONAL LAW, supra note 136, at 1518-19.
276. Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 565.
277. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 136, at 1519.
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state has allowed to exist for certain of its citizens.2 7 8 Using the Sheff
case as an example, the antisubjugation principle implies that by fo-
cusing on the condition of segregation existing in the schools of the
Hartford metropolitan area, and by declaring outright, as the Brown
Court did, that subjecting children to these inherently unequal condi-
tions constitutes a per se violation of their fundamental right to an
equal educational opportunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court could
more fully realize the goal of equal protection within the framework
of Connecticut's constitutional values.
Such an approach may, at the present time, be beyond the reach
of the federal courts. However, it is fully supported and arguably re-
quired by the express language of Article I, Section 20 of the Connect-
icut Constitution, which states in part that "No person shall be denied
the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or dis-
crimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political
rights."2 79
Under the standard rules of constitutional interpretation, the
word "subjected" must be construed as having some meaning and
should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, unless a special mean-
ing was clearly intended by the drafters. The ordinary meanings of
"subjected," when used as a verb and particularly when followed by
"to," as it is in Section 20, are: "to bring under domination, control, or
influence; to cause to undergo or to expose to something specified; to
make liable or vulnerable; to lay open or expose. '280 Interestingly, in
light of the antisubjugation principle discussed above, the ordinary
meanings of the word "subjugate" are: "to bring under complete con-
trol or subjection; to conquer, to master; to make submissive or sub-
servient; to enslave."2'1 The importance of the definitional
interrelationship between the two terms "subjugation" and "subjec-
tion" cannot be overlooked in the construction of the phrase, "be sub-
jected to" in Article I, Section 20.
In addition to the plain meaning rule, Connecticut courts have
ascribed to the fundamental tenet of constitutional construction which
directs that a constitutional provision should be construed to give the
provision effective operation and to suppress the mischief at which it
278. Whereas the antidiscrimination principle [and the discriminatory intent/causation
requirement which it has spawned] look[ ] inward to the perpetrator's state of mind, the
antisubjugation principle looks outward to the victim's state of existence. Id.
279. CONN. CONSr. art. I, § 20 (emphasis added).
280. THE RANDOM HousE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1893 (2d ed.
1987).
281. Id. (emphasis added).
was aimed.281 The insertion by the drafters of very particularized lan-
guage into the second Equal Protection Clause of the Connecticut
Constitution in 1965, in full awareness of the major expansion of polit-
ical and civil rights then occurring, must have been aimed at sup-
pressing the mischief of the continued subjugation of African-
Americans and other target groups in Connecticut. To follow the
words "subjected to" with words as uncompromisingly negative as
"segregation" and "discrimination" clearly indicates that the drafters
did not intend "subjected to" to carry the sunnier meaning of "to
bring under dominion," but rather to carry the full negative burden of
the phrase-that is, to expose, to make vulnerable, to subjugate, to
enslave.
In reflecting on the power of Connecticut courts to assign in-
dependent weight to state constitutional provisions, in particular those
relating to the protection of civil rights and liberties, Chief Justice Pe-
ters has urged courts to search for historical data and precedents to
illuminate the constitutional text. In the absence of such evidence,
however, Chief Justice Peters urges courts to look to the agenda of the
Connecticut Constitution as a whole in the context of the central his-
torical and sociological issues present at the time of ratification." 3
Surely, in 1965, ten years after Brown and in the midst of the civil
rights movement in which Connecticut citizens took such an early and
active role, we must assume that the drafters of this extraordinary and
unique provision recognized that some Connecticut citizens were still
being subjected to segregation and discrimination in the exercise and
enjoyment of their political and civil rights. They must have been
equally aware that this condition resulted in the subjugation of these
individuals to second-class citizen status which could no longer be tol-
erated in a state committed to the equal worth of all persons under the
law.
The Connecticut Supreme Court expanded on this recognition in
Horton by declaring "that in Connecticut, elementary and secondary
education is a fundamental right, [and] that pupils in the public
schools are entitled to the equal enjoyment of that right . ... "I'
Reading that holding into the language of Article I, Section 20, it
seems clear that the Connecticut Constitution forbids any person to
suffer segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his
or her fundamental right to education.
282. Palka v. Walker, 198 A. 265, 267 (Conn. 1938).
283. Peters, supra note 72, at 583-86.
284. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 369-70 (Conn. 1977).
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Connecticut courts have also adopted the rule of construction
that effect must be given to every part and word of the constitution
unless there is a clear reason for not doing so.285 By using the disjunc-
tive "or" between "segregation" and "discrimination," the drafters
must have intended the words to carry different import. Discrimina-
tion may imply an invidious act by a wrongdoer.286 But to this consti-
tutionally impermissible act, the drafters added a second condition-
not to "segregate," which might also imply a conscious act of isolation,
but rather a person's being "subjected to segregation." This condition
arguably exists whenever a person is left to endure a segregated condi-
tion which the state might reasonably prevent.
The children in Hartford and its surrounding suburbs are being
"subjected to segregation," and to its known harmful effects, when the
State of Connecticut regards state-imposed school district lines as sac-
rosanct and refuses to abridge them, as well as when a child's funda-
mental right to an equal education is valued less highly than a town's
interest in maintaining impermeable borders.2 7 By maintaining these
so-called neutral systems, the state has consented to the continued
subjugation of these children as second-class citizens in the majority
culture.
Many states have adopted this per se approach to government
responsibility based on the premise that racially unbalanced schools
are inherently unequal and that the failure of the state to remedy this
unequal treatment of minorities is a denial of equal protection regard-
less of the underlying causes.288 On this reasoning, intent and foresee-
ability are irrelevant. In People ex rel. Lynch v. San Diego Unified
School District,289 a California appellate court found that the knowing
failure of a school board to remedy an imbalance that resulted in in-
285. Cahill v. Leopold, 103 A.2d 818, 828 (Conn. 1954).
286. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
287. Such borders can, of course, be readily breached to achieve cost savings in police
and fire protection or garbage removal. Several sister states have recognized that the fixa-
tion on local control must end if equality rights are to be preserved. See, e.g., Rose v.
Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). In the Rose case, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that "[e]ach child... in this Commonwealth must be provided with an
equal opportunity to have an adequate education. Equality is the keyword here. The chil-
dren of the poor and the children of the rich.. . must be given the same opportunity and
access .... This obligation cannot be shifted to local counties and local school districts." Id.
at 211 (emphasis added). Notably, Kentucky has produced some of the most outstanding
examples of successful desegregation plans in the country, in particular the plan imple-
mented in the central city of Jefferson County, Louisville.
288. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 136, at 1515-16.
289. 96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
ferior education for African-American students was sufficient to attri-
bute responsibility to the state for curing the problem. 9 °
A similar approach was taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Jenkins v. Township of Morris School District.29' Recommending
an interdistrict remedy to solve racial imbalance, the Court eschewed
the seemingly inviolate nature of school district lines, saying "govern-
mental subdivisions of the state may readily be bridged when neces-
sary to vindicate state constitutional rights and policies. ' 92
The holdings in the three Horton cases, and the principle of "ba-
sic fairness" which the Connecticut Supreme Court announced as un-
derlying all equal protection cases under the Connecticut Constitution
in Moscone v. Manson,2 93 argue in favor using the same per se ap-
proach in Connecticut. This is particularly true in light of the clear
and convincing evidence of the severe social, academic, and intellec-
tual detriments suffered by children in segregated schools. 294 The
State's own experts originally recommended just such a per se ap-
proach to segregative conditions, calling for "collective responsibility"
among the cities and their contiguous and adjacent suburbs in eradi-
cating racial imbalance in the schools. 295 This recommendation was
ultimately rejected by state officials who feared the political backlash
of a mandatory approach to desegregation. Shortly after this rejec-
tion, the Sheff case was filed.
The State's knowing failure to eradicate the condition of metro-
politan-wide school segregation currently existing in Connecticut is all
the more intolerable because of the State's power to "define expecta-
tions, confer legitimacy, establish a status quo, and thus necessarily
shape the nature and distribution of interests and attitudes in society
itself. '2 96 By refusing to resolve the problem, the state affirms as inev-
itable the status quo of racial imbalance and its effects in metropoli-
tan-area schools. Surely, this is a constitutionally impermissible result.
290. Id at 666.
291. 279 A.2d 619 (N.J. 1971).
292. Id. at 629.
293. 440 A.2d 848 (Conn. 1981).
294. See infra Part III(b), for discussion of numerous research projects which have enu-
merated these harms.
295. COMM. ON RACIAL EQUALITY, CONN. ST. BD. OF EDUC., A REPORT ON RACIAL/
ETHNIC EQUITY AND DESEGREGATION IN CONNECTICUT's PUBLIC SCHOOLS 11-18 (Jan.
1988).
296. Tribe, Constitutional Theories, supra note 136, at 1078.
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IIb. The Value of Successfully Desegregated Schools:
An Empirical Review
A per se approach to segregative conditions under state constitu-
tional provisions is supported by empirical research studies which af-
firm the value of racially balanced schools to minority and White
students alike, to their parents, and to the society at large. Depriva-
tion of the opportunity to attend such schools in many metropolitan
areas of the United States has exacerbated the problems of the inner
cities and made the words of Thurgood Marshall, dissenting in Milli-
ken v. Bradley, seem particularly prescient: "In the short run, it may
seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to
be divided up each into two cities-one white, the other black-but it
is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret."29 7
It seems especially fitting to recall Justice Marshall's words and to
use them as a starting point for assessing the results of school desegre-
gation plans in our nation's cities. However, there is a bittersweet
irony in this assessment. Professor Liebman has answered the ques-
tion, "Is school desegregation dead?" by observing that school deseg-
regation appears to be "alive and well" throughout the South in cities
like Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina; Greenville, South Caro-
lina; Jacksonville, Florida; Louisville, Kentucky; Nashville-Davidson,
Tennessee; and Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida, where mandatory
school desegregation plans came with a court order in the late-1960s
and early 1970s, and stayed to become a source of intense civic
pride.298 To this exemplary list must be added Stamford, Connecticut,
297. 418 U.S. 717, 814-15 (1974).
298. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1465-67, specifically 1466 nn.6 & 7. I would concur in
Leibman's "alive and well" assessment. To his list I would add Darien, Georgia, one of the
cities which, in addition to Charlotte, Greenville, Louisville and Tampa, I have studied
over the last four years on several trips south to visit successfully desegregated school dis-
tricts. Each of the cities visited was desegregated as part of a county-wide plan, and each
has been exceptionally successful in retaining a commitment to racial balance over the
years, despite major demographic changes in their counties.
I should say at the outset of this research-oriented section that what may appear to be
my emphasis on the "benefits" side of the research data, which is by far the most volumi-
nous, most likely stems from my having seen first hand the power of the law to change a
society's fundamental values. Twenty-five years after Jim Crow ruled in these counties, I
have seen minority and White children learning and playing together in modern, well-
maintained and well-equipped schools, some of the finest I have seen in 30 years in educa-
tion, first as a teacher, then as director of an educational research facility, and now as a
professor of law. I have visited schools in each district and interviewed students, teachers,
parents, and school administrators, all of whom were anxious to tell me how it can be done
when people are committed and "it's the law of the land." While outside of the South,
many of us have prayed that busing and desegregation would never come to our cities,
which alone among Connecticut's cities has succeeded in effectively
integrating its schools, also under a mandatory school desegregation
plan.
What makes for successful desegregation? The most authorita-
tive current empirical research has established that substantial pro-
gress has been achieved in school districts with court or
administratively-ordered desegregation plans, whereas little or no
progress has been noted in the eighty-five percent of school districts
without such plans.2 99 The same research has shown that the highest
level of progress has been achieved in areas in which the desegrega-
tion plan was mandatory rather than voluntary, where desegregation
occurred at all grade levels from the plan's inception, and where the
plan included interdistrict desegregation techniques such as "pairing"
and "clustering. '30 0  County-wide plans were particularly effective.
these courageous people have been conducting a vast 25-year experiment in social change
for the nation. I have reviewed twenty-five years of standardized test scores and have
concluded that the gains in these successful districts are even more impressive than those
homogenized over an entire region and reflected in the national studies. I have inter-
viewed business executives and civic leaders in Greenville, South Carolina, who have told
me that their region's current status as the engine of American economic growth could
never have been achieved in a segregated society and without their twenty-five year "in-
vestment in human capital." E.g., interviews with Arnold Norz, Vice-President, Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co.; Becky Turner, C.E.O., Haywood Mall Dev. Corp.; Max Heller, former
Exec. Dir., Economic Dev. Bd., State of South Carolina, Rudolph Gordon, Asst. Superin-
tendent, Greenville County Schools, and others, in Greenville, South Carolina (Feb. 21-24,
1994). When I think of the South 25 years ago with its intense hatreds, its poverty, and
what must have seemed the great unlikelihood of success, I confess to impatience when it is
said that a court-mandated planning process in Connecticut, the most affluent state in the
nation, will cause "blood to run in the streets." I hope, therefore, I will be forgiven if the
tone of this section is not totally that of the neutral observer, but rather of one who has
gone to see it work-and marvelled.
299. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1468 (citing FINIS WELCH & AUDREY LIorr, NEw
EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 40,67, and Table 12 (U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights
Clearinghouse Publ. 92 1987)).
300. The "pairing" of schools involves taking a group of schools in a metropolitan area
which has heretofore been racially and ethnically segregated and pairing one minority and
one white school which are geographically proximate to each other. One elementary
school which has previously included grades K-6 is typically converted into a K-3 school
and the other, a 4-6 school, thus achieving racial balance in both and minimizing the dis-
tance travelled to school by all children in that "paired" area. By "clustering" a group of
schools in one area of the county and reorganizing the grade levels so that grades K-12 can
all be served in this concentrated area, many southern districts were able to tell parents
whose children were entering the district at kindergarten, exactly which schools their chil-
dren would attend from grades K-12, barring unforeseen demographic changes which
might necessitate re-assignment. This technique also minimized travel distances and
calmed the fears of parents who had been unnerved by the anti-busing shibboleth, "small
children will spend hours on buses travelling to outlying areas," as well as by the specter of
their child's moving from school to school each year to achieve racial balance. Interviews
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The irony, of course, is that many of these county-wide plans were
implemented in the South, the region which has demonstrated the
most progress in integration.301
In the generation since these executive branch and court-ordered
desegregation plans were initiated, widespread progress, which could
only be predicted in 1954, has been substantiated by empirical re-
search. Writing in 1965, Professor Fiss catalogued the various harms
which were said to result from segregation: the psychological harm to
African-American children, who feel insult and stigma whether their
schools have been de jure or de facto segregated; the academic and
intellectual harms resulting from inferior school plants, educational
materials, teachers, and curricula; and the perpetuation of social barri-
ers which results when minority children are deprived of the further
opportunity to "develop relationships with.., members of the domi-
nant class."' 3 2 Professor Fiss acknowledged the difficulty in drawing
causal connections in the absence of empirical data showing that such
harms can be remedied by attacking the segregated condition, but ar-
gued that support for this proposition "is suggested by the embryonic
indications of improved... achievement by [minority students] in in-
tegrated schools. '30 3
Today, these indications are no longer embryonic. Vol-nes of
research data in several disciplines now indicate that minority per-
formance in desegregated schools has improved, and minority per-
formance on standardized achievement tests has risen in desegregated
settings.30 4 It has also been well-documented that career opportuni-
with school officials in Charlotte-Mecklenburg County and others named supra note 298,
October 1991, January 1993, and February 1994.
301. See WELCH & LIGHT, supra note 299, at n.6 Tables 1, Al, and A2.
302. Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 568-570.
303. Id. at 569.
304. The most highly-respected researchers on minority achievement have concluded
that attendance in racially balanced schools improves the educational outcomes for minor-
ity students. See Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on Minority Achievement in
Desegregated Schools, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 103, 124
(Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983); Willis D. Hawley & Mark A. Smylie,
The Contribution of School Desegregation to Academic Achievement and Racial Integra-
tion, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY 284-85 (Phyllis Katz and Dal-
mas Taylor eds., 1988); Christopher Jencks & M. Brown, The Effects of Desegregation on
Student Achievement: Some New Evidence from the Equality of Educational Opportunity
Survey, 48 Soc. OF EDUC. 136-37 (1975); Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, Desegregation
and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, in 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17-56
(1978); Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, The Effect of Research Methodology on Deseg-
regation-Achievement Studies: A Meta-Analysis, in 88(5) AM. J. Soc. 839-54 (1983); Paul M.
Wortman & Fred B. Bryant, School Desegregation and Black Achievement: An Integrative
Review, in 13(3) SOC. METHODS AND RES. 289-324 (1985). See generally JAMES S. COLE-
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ties of minorities attending desegregated schools have improved.3 0 5
This evidence is particularly important because other studies have
shown that the isolation of minorities in poor urban areas is the great-
est barrier to their social and economic mobility.30 6
Professor Liebman has also cited extensive research indicating
that in addition to improvements in standardized test scores and ca-
reer options, minority students have made substantial gains in I.Q.
scores which erase a third to one-half of the overall difference be-
tween African-American and White students. 0 7 These gains, widely
believed to be due to the changing expectations of African-American
students by teachers in desegregated settings, are strongest when de-
segregation begins in the early grades, has a metropolitan-wide plan,
and takes place in predominately white schools with a critical mass of
African-American students. 30 8 The preponderance of the evidence
MAN ET AL, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966); NANCY H. ST. JOHN,
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN (1975); Robert L. Crain & Rita E.
Mahard, Minority Achievement: Policy Implications of Research, in EFFEcTIVE SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION: EQUITY, QUALITY, AND FEASIBILITY (Willis D. Hawley ed., 1981) [here-
inafter EFFECIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION]. Notably, many of the gains reported can be
impaired by techniques such as "ability-group tracking," which may create segregated
classes within desegregated schools. See generally MEYER WEINBERG, THE SEARCH FOR
QUALITY INTEGRATED EDUCATION: POLICY AND RESEARCH ON MINORITY STUDENTS IN
SCHOOL AND COLLEGE 146-71 (1983); William L. Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the
Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1710-11 nn.36-42 (1986).
305. Attending desegregated schools apparently helps African-American students
break through the structural barriers to employment which have resulted from discrimina-
tion in the labor market. There are many other employment-related benefits. African-
American students who attend racially balanced schools tend to have more friends in the
majority culture, to live in integrated neighborhoods, to finish high school and/or college,
and to work in higher status jobs upon graduation. See Jomills H. Braddock, II & James M.
McPartland, Going to College and Getting a Good Job: The Impact of Desegregation, in
EFFEcrIvE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, supra note 304, at 141-54; Jomills H. Braddock, II &
James M. McPartland, Social-Psychological Processes that Perpetuate Racial Segregation:
The Relationship Between School and Employment Desegregation, 19 J. BLACK STUD. 267-
89 (1989); Jon W. Hoelter, Segregation and Rationality in Black Status Aspiration
Processes, 55 Soc. OF EDUC. 31-39 (1982); and Gary Orfield, Housing Patterns and Deseg-
regation Policy, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, supra note 304 at 185-224. See
generally ROBERT L. CRAIN & JACK STRAUSS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK OC-
CUPATIONAL ATrAINMENT. RESULTS FROM A LONG-TERM EXPERIMENT (1985); G.
THOMAS, THE ACCESS AND SUCCESS OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS IN U.S. GRADUATE AND
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (1986).
306. See T. COOK, BLACK ACHIEVEMENT AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 985 (1984)
(finding that African-American students educated in desegregated schools are more likely
to graduate from high school and college and to major in more remunerative subjects). See
generally WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).
307. See Liebman, supra note 136, at 1624-25 n.675.
308. See generally Jomills H. Braddock, II & James M. McPartland, The Social and
Academic Consequences of School Desegregation, EouITY & CHoicE, Feb. 1988.
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also suggests that African-American students who attend desegre-
gated schools feel less stigmatized by race. Moreover, desegregation
has been shown to make both African-American and White students
who attend such schools from an early age more comfortable in ra-
cially integrated settings as adults.319 Progress for Hispanic students
in desegregated schools, though not yet as widely researched, appears
to be equally impressive. 10
It is particularly important to note that none of this progress by
minority students has been achieved at the expense of White students'
progress, as had been feared in 1954 and is still feared today. Studies
of student achievement in desegregated settings have shown that
White achievement test scores have either risen slightly or stayed the
same.311 It has also been shown that white students have benefited
from the school reforms which typically are initiated as part of a de-
segregation plan, as well as the increases in teacher training and inter-
racial cooperation that desegregation fosters.312 White students, as
well as minority students, benefit from learning to function in a ra-
cially diverse environment, a prerequisite for functioning in the ra-
cially diverse workforce of the future.313
Nor has racial animosity or "white flight," which may occur at the
beginning stages of a given implementation plan, been a permanent
result.314 In fact, those metropolitan areas which have implemented
successful desegregation plans have actually experienced the lowest
rates of white flight because of the enlargement of school district
cachement areas beyond city boundaries and the unlinking of school
309. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1630 (quoting AMY GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCA-
TION 160, 163).
310. See U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN-AMERICAN EDUCATION STUDY (Re-
ports I-VI, April 1971-February 1974); Mexicano/Chicano Concerns in School Desegrega-
tion in Los Angeles (Monograph No. 9, UCLA Chicano Studies Center, 1977).
311. See WEINBERG, supra note 304, passin. See also the work of one of the State of
Connecticut's own researchers: JANET W. SCHOFIELD, CONN. ST. DEP'T OF EDUC., REVIEW
OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION'S IMPACT ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL STU-
DENTS (1989).
312. Desegregation has led to more educational reform than any other "school reform"
methodology. MEYER WEINBERG, NAT'L INST. OF EDUC., MINORITY STUDENTS: A RE-
SEARCH APPRAISAL 329 (1977).
313. U.S. LABOR DEP'T, WORKFORCE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (1987); U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N PROJECT 2000: JOB AND
TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN (1984). Both of these reports
concluded that the workforce of the future will be increasingly multiracial and that those
workers who know how to function effectively in these job settings will have substantial
employment advantages.
314. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1622.
attendance zones and places of residence.31 Ironically, it is those
cases in which the cities alone have been included in the desegregation
remedy-such as Detroit, Kansas City, St. Louis, Boston, and
others-or those which have implemented no desegregation plan at
all, which have experienced the highest incidence of white flight.3 16
On a related issue, it is also important to note that in Sheff, the
lower court's finding that school segregation is largely the result of
residential segregation beyond the power of courts to rectify is contra-
dicted by research. Empirical studies indicate that although the two
forms of segregation are related, the causal connection actually runs in
the opposite direction.317 One of many studies concluded that school
desegregation between 1968 and 1973 doubled the rate of housing in-
tegration in 25 central cities with an African-American population of
at least 100,000.318 Another study of 960 school districts found that
cities which implemented metropolitan-wide desegregation plans ex-
perienced substantially increased housing integration, an effect evi-
dent in districts of all sizes and in all regions of the country.319 Other
studies have indicated that districts which have experienced desegre-
gation over the longest period of time have the lowest levels of hous-
ing segregation as well.320
Therefore, it would appear that the Sheff lower court's finding
that school segregation is the result of housing segregation may be
false, as is the notion that the state is powerless to effect desegregation
in either of these areas. The lower court's adoption of this view in
315. See id at 1621 and particularly 1621-29 nn.664-693. See also WELCH & LIGHT,
supra note 299, at 3-4.
316. Id
317. See generally JOMILLS H. BRADDOCK, II & JAMES M. McPARTLAND, MORE EVI-
DENCE ON THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES THAT PERPETUATE MINORITY SEGRE-
GATION: THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND HOUSING
DESEGREGATION (Johns Hopkins University, Center for the Social Organization of the
Schools, Report 338, 1983); WILLIs D. HAWLEY, ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE DE-
SEGREGATION: LESSONS FROM RESEARCH (1983); Gary Orfield, Housing Patterns and De-
segregation Policy, supra note 305, passim; DIANA PEARCE, NAT'L INST. OF EDUC.,
BREAKING DowN BARRIERS: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF METROPOLITAN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION ON HOUSING PATTERNS (1980); and Meyer Weinberg, Housing and
School Desegregation: Citizen Initiatives and Government Responses, 18 INTEGRATED EDU-
CATION 2-11 (July-August 1980).
318. Diana Pearce, Robert L. Crain, & R. Farley, Lessons Not Lost: The Impact of
School Desegregation on the Racial Ecology of Large American Central Cities, Paper
presented at the American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, New Orle-
ans (April 1984) (on file with author).
319. Karl Taeuber, Desegregation of Public School Districts: Persistence and Change,
PHI DELTA KAPPAN, September 1990, at 18-24.
320. See PEARCE, supra note 317, passim.
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Sheff merely contributes to the perception that segregated schools in
inner cities are inevitable, and that white flight "is an inherently pri-
vate matter beyond the scope of the law."'321
Much of the research data referred to above has been further
documented by the State of Connecticut's own blue ribbon commis-
sions which have studied this growing problem since 1965.321 These
prestigious groups have consistently recommended that the state do
everything in its power to rectify the segregated conditions which now
exist in Connecticut's schools. In reaching their conclusions, they
have relied on some of the data cited herein, as well as their own
commissioned report by Janet W. Schofield.3 23
In reaching its own decision in Sheff, the lower court appears to
have ignored this data as well as voluminous testimony at trial from
many of the most respected researchers in the country, who verified
the research findings referred to in this section, and more. As the
Findings of Fact issued on June 27, 1995 make clear, the court relied
instead on the testimony of the handful of experts who disputed this
body of research, only to find that the real problem in the Hartford
schools is not that they are racially segregated but rather that the chil-
dren attending these schools are so poor.324 Poverty, the court ex-
plained, is the strongest predictor of low academic achievement 32
(and, of course, is another factor beyond the power of the court to
remedy). Reasoning circularly, the court found that, taking the dis-
parity in socio-economic class into account, the children in Hartford
schools and those of its surrounding, largely White and affluent sub-
urbs are scoring at about the level one would expect on the state mas-
tery tests326 and therefore are receiving a "minimally adequate
education. '327 In effect, the court tells us that minority children are
doing as well as can be expected under the circumstances while ignor-
ing twenty years of research indicating what can be accomplished
when the circumstances are changed. By refusing to acknowledge the
321. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 28. See also supra note 185 and
accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., Gov.'s COMM'N ON QUALITY AND INTEGRATED EDUC., CROSSING THE
BRIDGE TO EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE: A VISION OF QUALITY AND INTEGRATED QUALITY
AND INTEGRATED EDUC. FOR CONN. (DEc. 1990) [hereinafter CROSSING THE BRIDGE];
CONN. ST. DEP'T OF EDUC., QUALITY AND INTEGRATED EDUC.: OPTIONS FOR CONN.
(April 1989) (Follow-up Report to the January 1988 Report).
323. See SCHOFIELD, supra note 311.
324. Sheff v. O'Neill, No. SC15255, 1995 Conn. LEXIS 249, at *30-*43 (June 27, 1995).
325. Id at *31.
326. Id at *42-*43.
327. IL at *40-*41.
power of courts to change the circumstances of children's lives, the
court has, like the federal courts before it, declared the status quo to
be inevitable.
This solid empirical record of progress has not been matched by
any of the alternative approaches to providing equal educational op-
portunity in racially isolated settings such as "separate but enhanced
schools" (termed the "gilded ghetto" approach by Liebman and
others), "effective schools," school-based management methodolo-
gies, all-minority high schools, minority control of city school boards
and other political institutions, and decentralized school districts.321
This failure by minority students to achieve equal educational and so-
cial progress in segregated settings under plans which focus on "equal
treatment and equal access" or other "make-do in segregated schools"
methodologies, has also been noted by the Governor's Commission
on Quality and Integrated Education, 329 the state's second group of
experts to stress the vital importance of racially balanced school set-
tings to the school achievement and social adjustment of minority chil-
dren in a majority culture.33 °
Perhaps if the research data were not so compelling, it might yet
be possible to argue that the State can provide equal educational op-
portunity in ways other than by assuring integrated school settings to
all Connecticut public school students. In Brown, the Supreme Court
declared that segregated schools were inherently unequal, largely on
the basis of tentative sociological data.331 There now appear to be
more than adequate indicators that this statement is correct: separate
can never be equal. To deprive Connecticut students, as well as their
parents and their communities, of the social, intellectual, academic,
and career achievements documented as achievable in successfully in-
tegrated schools, must be seen as a per se deprivation of the funda-
mental right to the equal educational opportunity mandated in
Horton332 because, as we now know, a like opportunity cannot be pro-
vided in any other way.
IV. Conclusion
State courts have a long history of independent constitutional ad-
judication under state constitutional provisions. More recently, the
328. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1489-91 n.142.
329. See CROSSING THE BRIDGE, supra note 322.
330. See SCHOFIELD, supra note 311.
331. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11, 495 (1954).
332. 376 A.2d 359, 369-70 (Conn. 1977).
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Connecticut Supreme Court has creatively construed its own constitu-
tion to provide additional protections to the rights and liberties of
Connecticut citizens beyond federal minimums. The lower court's de-
cision in Sheff v. O'Neill fails to fulfill the promise of that legacy, even
as it fails to protect the fundamental rights of some of the most vulner-
able of those citizens.
Should the Connecticut Supreme Court affirm the Sheff lower
court's opinion, it will be perpetuating the serious error made at the
federal level over twenty years ago. The United States Supreme
Court in effect said in Milliken, "We know that you are being deprived
of an equal educational opportunity due to your required attendance
in racially, ethnically and socio-economically segregated schools
within state-authorized attendance zones, but unless affirmative dis-
criminatory acts of the state have 'caused' the problem, we cannot
help you." This error has made one of the most troubling domestic
issues facing our country-perhaps the defining problem of American
history33 3-all but impossible to cure. However, there is one impor-
tant difference. The Connecticut Supreme Court will be acting with
full access to a body of extensive research unavailable when Milliken
was decided in 1974. Whether such findings would have diverted the
Milliken majority from their doctrinal course cannot be known. But
the moral dilemma for a Connecticut court acting under Connecticut
constitutional provisions in 1996 is substantially increased.
Instead, the Connecticut Supreme Court should overrule the
Sheff lower court's decision and, pursuant to their obligation to inde-
pendently construe the provisions of the Connecticut Constitution, de-
clare that the federal state action/discriminatory intent/causation
standard, which has hampered federal courts in solving the pernicious
problem of metropolitan-wide segregation, has no place in Connecti-
cut state constitutional adjudication.
The Connecticut Supreme Court should build on the excellent
foundation laid in Horton and take the lead from other states such as
Montana where the Montana Supreme Court declared a fundamental
state right to education and held that the state constitutional guaran-
tee of equality of educational opportunity was not merely an aspira-
tional goal but a real guarantee, binding on all three branches of
government, whether at the state, local, or school district level.334
Surely, in light of what we now know can be achieved by making good
on such a guarantee, the school-age plaintiffs in Sheff deserve no less.
333. See Liebman, supra note 136, at 1473.
334. Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 684-88 (Mont. 1989).
